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What are the main political dynamics in dealing with the 
sexual misconduct of South African personnel in the UN 
peace mission in the DRC? A Constructivist Exploration of 
Norm Internalisation. 
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1. Introduction 
This research aims to explore the main political dynamics that occur when dealing with 
sexual misconduct perpetrated by United Nations (UN)-affiliated personnel during UN peace 
missions. 
1.1. Research Problem 
Sexual violence in conflict situations, especially when the alleged perpetrators are UN peace 
mission personnel, is not a new phenomenon but has been the subject of renewed public 
attention by media sources and the UN. Traditionally, conflict-related sexual violence was 
understood to be perpetrated by groups that are party to the conflict.1 However, there has 
been an increased focus on inter-governmental organisation (IGO) peace mission personnel 
as the perpetrators of these crimes. This has generated renewed interest in the complex 
matters of accountability and discipline when it comes to crimes of a sexual nature.  
According to the available public record data seen in Figure 1 below, there has been a steady 
decline in allegations of SEA following what was reported in the early 2000s. While the 
general trend of declining allegations could be argued to coincide with improvements in the 
UN’s anti-sexual misconduct policies, that allegations continue to occur at all is still a 
concern. 
                                                 
 
1 Dara Kay Cohen, “Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980-2009),” American 
Political Science Review 107(2013): 462-466. 
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Figure 1: Sexual exploitation and abuse over time in MONUC/MONUSCO (Source: United Nations 
Conduct). 
Although the UN online database does not contain data prior to 2007, a 2004 memorandum 
written by United Nations Organisation Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUC) officials referenced 150 allegations of sexual misconduct, which also included 
children who were raped and included in a child prostitution ring.2 Furthermore, a 2016 
Report of the Secretary-General indicates that 16 allegations were received relating to United 
Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUSCO) personnel, which do  not correspond with the 14 allegations reported on the 
UN’s online misconduct database.3 Despite these minor discrepancies, Figure 2 illustrates 
that MONUC and MONUSCO are where the majority of allegations have occurred in recent 
                                                 
 
2 Vanessa Kent, “Protecting civilians from UN peacekeepers and humanitarian workers: Sexual exploitation and 
abuse,” in Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and 
Ramesh Thakur (New York: United Nations University Press, 2007), 47; Bonnie Kovatch, “Sexual exploitation 
and abuse in UN peacekeeping missions: A case study of MONUC and MONUSCO,” The Journal of the 
Middle East and Africa 7(2016): 158; Kelly Neudorfer, ‘Reducing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Does 
Deterrence Work to Prevent SEAs in UN Peacekeeping Missions?’ International Peacekeeping 21(2014): 624; 
Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley, ‘Explaining sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping missions: The 
role of female peacekeepers and gender equality in contributing countries,’ Journal of Peace Research 
53(2016):111. 
3 United Nations, ‘Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse,’ United Nations 
General Assembly document A/70/729, 16 February 2016, http://undocs.org/A/70/729.  
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years, with personnel deployed from South Africa receiving significant proportions of the 
allegations. 
 
Figure 2: Sexual exploitation and abuse allegations made against South African military personnel in 
MONUSCO (Source: United Nations Conduct). 
IGOs like the UN are of particular importance given their formal acceptance of norms, one of 
which concerns the appropriate behaviour towards women. When these organisations declare 
their belief in these norms about proper behaviour towards women, it is reasonable to expect 
their members to behave accordingly. In instances where this is not the case, and their 
behaviour appears at odds with their declared belief in the norm, we should be able to 
question why this is so. 
The above information is just a brief overview; it demonstrates that addressing sexual 
misconduct is the joint responsibility of the UN and state of South Africa as the key actors in 
this process. The UN, as an international institution and “organisational platform” plays a 
crucial role in the establishment and practice of norms, or appropriate standards of behaviour, 
in international relations.4  
                                                 
 
4 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International 
Organization 52(1998): 899, Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The socialization of international human 
rights norms into domestic practices: introduction,” in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and 
Domestic Change, ed. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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In its peace missions, the UN as an organisational platform is a complicated alliance, 
involving contributing states who have volunteered their services; the host state; the UN 
Security Council, the author of the mission mandates; the UN Peacekeeping Office (DPKO); 
and the mission in a country. However, the UN’s personnel in “coalitions of the willing”5 
have not escaped scrutiny for sexual misconduct. In fact, in scholarship, there is an increased 
acknowledgement that UN personnel in peace missions are perpetrators of sexual misconduct 
towards women. This raises the issue of how the senior partner in a mission, responsible for 
good conduct, deals with the sexual misconduct of contributing countries. 
Although the UN has an extensive framework to address sexual misconduct through its ‘zero-
tolerance’ policy,6 the onus is on the troop contributing country (TCC) to ensure that its 
contributed personnel behave in accordance with UN standards and hold them accountable 
when they do not. The purpose of this research is to explore and analyse the main political 
dynamics between South Africa as a TCC and the UN in dealing with sexual misconduct 
against women by South African personnel deployed in the UN’s DRC peace mission. 
Most South African personnel deployed in UN peace missions have been part of 
MONUSCO, which was established in June 2010 and is currently the largest UN peace 
mission,7 and its predecessor, MONUC. South Africa is one of the largest African TCCs and 
the third largest overall troop contributor for MONUSCO, having provided 1,161 military 
personnel.8  
South Africa has declared its belief in and support of the norm that sexual abuse and 
exploitation of women is unacceptable behaviour.9 Yet a high number of allegations and 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Press, 1999), 7; Annika Björkdahl, “Promoting norms through peacekeeping: UNPREDEP and conflict 
prevention,” International Peacekeeping 13(2006): 215. 
5 Shepard Forman and Derk Segaar, “New Coalitions for Global Governance: The Changing Dynamics of 
Multilateralism,” Global Governance 12(2006): 207. 
6 “Standards overview,” United Nations Conduct, accessed 18 March 2018, 
https://conduct.unmissions.org/standards-overview.  
7 “MONUSCO Fact Sheet,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed 12 January 2018, 
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde and Thomas Mandrup, “When Peacekeepers do Damage: Sexual exploitation and 
Abuse in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Danish Institute for International Studies Policy Brief (2017): 3, 
https://www.ethz.ch/content/specialinterest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/en/services/digital-
library/publications/publication.html/bbe4b4eb-5005-4fe9-935a-96d4ce289677. 
3; United Nations, “Update on Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations and Special Political Missions,” 17 May 2016, 3; United Nations General Assembly, “Special 
measures for protection from SEA,” 29. 
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instances of sexual abuse and exploitation by South African personnel in MONUC and 
MONUSCO is a matter of public record. Media reporting has singled out South African UN 
personnel as being particularly ill-disciplined, which is to an extent supported by UN data 
since the UN began keeping record on the nationalities of the alleged perpetrators in 2015 
(see Figure 2 above). However, when looking at the data concerning allegations, it is 
important to note that these rates are relative. A TCC with fewer allegations may have a 
higher rate of misconduct because they have a smaller fraction of the personnel.  
Another reason that South Africa is included as a focal actor is because it is a newly 
democratic state. According to Acharya, newly democratic states may accept global norms as 
part of national identity-construction and the legitimation of new practices.10 In the aftermath 
of apartheid, South Africa needed to construct a new, post-racial national identity and 
demonstrate that they were no longer an international pariah. Adopting certain international 
norms including standards of what is considered appropriate behaviour towards women is one 
way to construct a national identity that is consistent with the shared values of the 
international community and receive international legitimacy. This demonstrates the 
constitutive role that norms can play. 
Sexual misconduct and violence are a violation of international multiple norms and 
international law. Additionally, sexual misconduct by peace mission personnel undermines 
peace missions in other ways. Peace missions are complex operations that involve a large 
number of human and financial resources. Between 1999 and 2014, MONUC and 
MONUSCO jointly cost approximately USD 10 billion.11 Personnel that commit crimes 
against vulnerable populations violate the trust, and erode the local confidence, that is 
necessary for such large operations to be effective and achieve their mandates. These 
malpractices ultimately “defeat the purpose of their mission”.12  
Furthermore, sexual crimes committed against civilians violate international and legal norms 
concerning civilian immunity during conflict. However, this research focuses on the sexual 
abuse and exploitation of women because they are women, not because they are civilians in a 
                                                 
 
10 Amitav Acharya, “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Chance in 
Asian Regionalism,” International Organisation 58(2004): 247. 
11 “MONUSCO at a Glance,” United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, January 2016, https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/global_factsheet._eng.pdf. 
12 Elizabeth F. Defeis, ‘U.N. Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity,’ 
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 7(2008):187. 
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conflict-zone, although there is certainly an overlap in these normative frameworks. It is 
therefore important not only to hold perpetrators of such crimes accountable, but also to 
ensure that there exist sufficient measures aimed at protecting women by deterring potential 
perpetrators from committing such crimes.  
Any examination of the misconduct of peace mission-personnel cannot focus solely on the 
UN. Although the UN sets the overarching framework within which contributed personnel 
must operate, the UN has limited enforcement authority. The variances in assault allegation 
data alone cannot be used as a means to evaluate policy effectiveness, nor does it explain the 
failure of peacekeeping forces to comply with UN policies. This is where the issue of 
political dynamics in addressing sexual misconduct becomes most important.  
Following allegations of abuse of refugees in West Africa and an Office of Internal Oversight 
Services (OIOS) investigation, Kofi Annan, then-UN Secretary General, signed a bulletin 
(ST/SGB/2003/13) which marked the introduction of the zero-tolerance policy. This bulletin 
reinforced pre-existing commitments to international humanitarian law by UN personnel by 
outlining the institutional policy on the prohibition of SEA-related activities.13 Sections 
3.2(a) to 3.2(f) outline a comprehensive list of prohibited activities, namely: any sexual 
activity with a child; exchanging sexual activities for monetary or other goods and services; 
and sexual relationships between UN staff and aid beneficiaries.14 Following the issuance of 
the Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, it was 
required that all missions track and report SEA allegations made against their personnel. 
However, subsequent investigations found that there were “widespread allegations of rape, 
abuse, and prostitution”, in the DRC.15 To date, allegations of sexual misconduct continue to 
be made against UN personnel despite the extensive UN policy framework and zero-tolerance 
policy. 
Constructivists provide one approach to explore the question of the difference between what 
people declare their beliefs to be and what their actual behaviour is. The main intention of 
                                                 
 
13 United Nations Secretariat, “Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse,” 
United Nations Secretariat document ST/SGB/2003/13, 9 October 2003.  
14 Ibid., 2. 
15 Kovatch, 160. 
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Constructivism is to analyse the role of norms on the stage of world politics.16  In this 
approach, norms are defined as, “the collective expectations about proper behaviour.”17 
According to Finnemore and Sikkink, international norms emerge and spread in three stages:  
Norm Emergence, Norm Cascade, and Norm Internalisation.18  Norm Emergence is when 
norm entrepreneurs – those who are the initial advocates for new norms –try to persuade 
states to adopt their new norm. The second stage, Norm Cascade, is characterised by norm 
leaders convincing states to follow new norms through socialisation. States may also embrace 
new norms for other reasons, including legitimacy, conformity or enhanced self-esteem.19 
Sexual abuse and exploitation of women has been recognised by the international community 
as unacceptable behaviour, as is evidenced by several UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
resolutions that condemn all forms of violence against women.20 Thus, Norm Emergence and 
Cascade have occurred. The focus in the Norm Life Cycle must therefore shift to Norm 
Internalisation. Norm internalisation underlines the importance that actors accept the norm as 
appropriate for themselves and behave accordingly.21 
Thus, the current research aims to explore the political dynamics in the UN-South Africa 
interaction in dealing with the sexual abuse and exploitation of women by South African 
personnel deployed in MONUC and MONUSCO. This exploration will examine the role of 
Norm Internalisation by especially South Africa. The concept of norm internalisation is 
underpinned by Constructivism. A theoretical case study design/format will be utilised in this 
study.   
                                                 
 
16 David M. Jones and Mike L. Smith, “Noise but No Signal: Strategy, Culture, and the Poverty of 
Constructivism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24(2001): 487-488. 
17 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity and Culture in National 
Security” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 54. 
18 Finnemore and Sikkink, 895. 
19 Ibid. 
20 “UN Resolutions on Violence against Women,” Stop Violence Against Women, accessed 30 October 2018, 
http://www.stopvaw.org/un_resolutions_on_violence_against_women. 
21 Finnemore and Sikkink, 895. 
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1.2. Concepts 
1.2.1. Sexual Misconduct in Relation to Women 
The UN and academic literature alike make use of the umbrella term sexual exploitation and 
abuse (SEA) to refer to the majority of crimes and prohibited actions associated with sexual 
violence by UN personnel.22 However, although the umbrella term is used, both sexual 
exploitation and sexual abuse are distinct terms. Sexual abuse includes all sexual activities 
with persons under the age of 18, as well as the “actual or threatened physical intrusion of a 
sexual nature by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.”23  
The UN separately defines sexual exploitation as the attempted or actual abuse of position for 
sexual purposes, including transactional sexual relations, their solicitation as well as any 
other kind of exploitative relationship.24 These definitions will be used in this study as they 
are relevant within the context of the primarily UN prescribed codes of conduct on prohibited 
sexual behaviour. 
The allegations levied against UN personnel generally and in the DRC specifically, indicated 
that there were more allegations of sexual exploitation than there were of sexual abuse. 
Between 2010 and 2018 in the DRC mission, there were 110 allegations of sexual 
exploitation, 83 allegations of sexual abuse and 7 allegations involving both sexual 
exploitation and sexual abuse.25 
It is important to clarify that this study will not take into account incidents of sexual 
harassment, which are distinct from incidents of SEA, and refer to prohibited behaviour in the 
workplace committed against UN personnel. Instead, this study intends to focus on SEA 
offences committed by UN personnel against local women that are not affiliated with the UN. 
UN victim data focuses on the age of victims and does not specify their gender. However, 
sexual violence in conflict is typically understood to be committed by men affiliated with 
military groups. In the absence of reliable data on the gender of victims, this study will work 
                                                 
 
22 “Glossary,” United Nations Conduct, accessed 23 October 2018, https://conduct.unmissions.org/glossary. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid. 
25 “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,” United Nations Conduct, accessed 23 October 2018, 
https://conduct.unmissions.org/sea-data-introduction. 
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on the pre-existing assumption that the victims of sexual violence are primarily women and 
girls. 
1.2.2. Peace Missions 
Peace mission is the term used collectively to refer to the full spectrum of peace and security 
related activities with an aim of upholding peace.26 A range of actors can undertake peace 
missions under the mandates of the UN or regional organisations individually or in 
collaboration. This study will be limited to the UN’s peace mission framework as outlined by 
the DPKO. While it may appear that there is a linear progression between peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding, this is not often the case. The DPKO has taken the position 
that these types of peace missions are “mutually reinforcing”,27 highlighting that their 
implementation in isolation is less likely to yield the desired results of sustained peace. 
1.2.2.1. Peacemaking 
Peacemaking in its most simple DPKO conception refers to actions that are intended to 
“bring hostile parties to agreement.”28 These actions can include the diplomatic provision of 
good offices, or any other diplomatic actions that facilitate negotiations between the parties in 
the conflict.29 Because of this, the actors involved range from UN representatives to 
governments and NGOs to prominent individuals.30 
1.2.2.2. Peacekeeping 
UN peacekeeping missions aim to develop and foster the conditions for sustainable, lasting 
peace by supporting the underlying political processes, for example, a peace agreement, that 
makes peace possible.31 Peacekeeping is a tool that comes into play when there is some kind 
of peace to maintain. This is typically after the fighting has stopped and a peace agreement is 
                                                 
 
26 Maxi Schoeman, “Foreign Policy and the Military: In Service of Reconstruction and Development?” in Post-
conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa: Concepts, role-players, policy and practice, ed. Theo 
Neethling and Heidi Hudson (Claremont: UCT Press, 2013), 209. 
27 United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, (New York: United 
Nations Secretariat, 2008), 20. 
28 Ibid., 98. 
29 Ibid., 17. 
30 Ibid., 17-18. 
31 “What is peacekeeping,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed 25 October 2018, 
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping. 
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in place, which the peacekeepers observe or help to implement.32 Traditional peacekeeping 
has also been deployed to serve as a buffer between conflicting parties and limit the 
violence.33 
Peacekeeping is underpinned by  three principles: all involved parties must consent, the 
mission must be impartial and the use of force is only permissible to defend the operation’s 
mandate and for self-defence.34 Peacekeeping differs from peace enforcement as it is not 
mandated to use coercion or military force in order to restore peace and security in situations 
where it has been authorised by the UN Security Council (UNSC).35 
Peacekeeping missions grounded in two legal agreements that are signed by all the 
consenting parties to the mission: a memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by the UN 
and the troop or police contributing countries (TCCs or PCCs), and a status of forces 
agreement (SOFA) which is signed by the UN and the host country. These documents grant 
the TCC exclusive jurisdiction over prosecution and discipline of members of their forces and 
immunity from prosecution by the host nation for violation of their law.36 
The participants in peacekeeping operations are typically classified as ‘peacekeepers’. 
Peacekeepers have moved away from a military-heavy composition as the nature and 
mandates of peacekeeping missions become more complex, dynamic and robust. 
Peacekeepers fall into three broad categories of personnel: military, police and civilian – all 
of whom contribute different skill sets and expertise to the overall mandate of the mission.37 
Military and police personnel are derived from the national military or police contingents of 
their countries of origin, and their primary affiliation remains with their national contingents 
                                                 
 
32 United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 18. 
33 Paul F. Diehl, Peace Operations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 4. 
34 “Principles of Peacekeeping,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed 25 October 2018, 
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping. 
35 United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 18. 
36 Carol Allais, ‘SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE BY UN PEACEKEEPERS: THE 
PSYCHOSOCIAL CONTEXT OF BEHAVIOUR CHANGE,’ South African Journal of Military Studies 
39(2011): 8.  
37 “Our Peacekeepers,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed 25 October 2018, 
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-peacekeepers. 
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throughout their secondment to work under UN command and control during peacekeeping 
missions.38 
1.2.2.3. Peacebuilding  
Peacebuilding involves the strengthening of local institutions and capabilities in order to 
prevent resurgences of violence by addressing the “root causes of conflict” and “lay the 
foundation of sustainable peace and development.”39 Peacebuilding is also referred to as 
multidimensional peace missions and involve large civilian elements.40 Although there may 
be temporal overlaps in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, peacebuilding is a long-term 
process that aims to restore the state’s ability to perform its functions adequately.41 
1.3. Literature Review 
This research will draw on academic literature on Constructivism as the theoretical 
framework as well as the norm life cycle as  outlined by Finnemore and Sikkink and the third 
stage, Norm Internalisation.42 The DPKO additionally noted that SEA does not occur in a 
vacuum and that to address it would require more than institutional and policy interventions, 
but also changes in the culture and attitudes held within peacekeeping missions.43  
Because the problem of SEA crimes by peacekeepers is an issue that jointly concerns the UN 
and the TCC, this section will look generally at the UN structures and literature more broadly 
related to the problem of peacekeeper sexual misconduct. Following this, it will look as South 
Africa specific literature and the trends therein, given that South Africa is the focal case study 
for this research. 
                                                 
 
38 “Military,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed 25 October 2018, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/military; 
“UN Police,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed 25 October 2018, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/un-
police. 
39 United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 18; Diehl, 9. 
40 Diehl, 14. 
41 United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 18-19. 
42 Finnemore and Sikkink, 895. 
43 Anna Shotton, “A Strategy to Address Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Peacekeeping 
Personnel,” Cornell International Law Journal 97(2006): 103-104. 
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1.3.1. The United Nations and Sexual Misconduct in Peace Missions 
It is perhaps most important to note that this study is not concerned with the phenomenon of 
rape as a tool or weapon used by parties in conflict during warfare, as that is an entirely 
different issue which is dealt with separately in the academic literature. Sexual violence 
committed by combatants in the DRC is also of a different nature, with gang rapes, genital 
mutilation and forcing family members to watch these incidents being far more common.44  
However, there still exists a significant body of literature on the topic of sexual misconduct 
by peacekeeping personnel in UN missions, specifically, and there is a general consensus 
among scholars that SEA violates the trust necessary for peacekeeping missions to be 
effective.45 As well as the presence of several UN produced reports on the topic of sexual 
misconduct. The academic literature, to a large degree, includes discussions on the 2005 
Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects 
(Zeid Report).46 There is also literature that notes the attempts that UN has made to address 
the problem, for instance, by 2007, the UN had dismissed or repatriated a total of 170 
military, civilian and police personnel following investigations.47 In fact, the commissioning 
of the Zeid Report itself was an intervention to address noncompliance with the earlier issued 
Secretary General’s bulletin on preventing sexual assault.48 Thus, while the zero in zero 
tolerance has not yet been fully actualised, it is undisputed that the UN has dedicated 
resources and efforts to addressing the ongoing issue of sexual misconduct in its missions. 
Scholars have written on the shortcomings of the UN to enforce its zero-tolerance policy. The 
UN maintains a set of rules and guidelines to which UN staff must comply, failure of which 
may result in disciplinary procedures.49 However, the zero tolerance policy is ambiguous on 
the legal applicability of the document on certain categories of peacekeeping personnel.50 For 
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example, personnel including contractors, consultants, experts and military observers are not 
considered UN staff and are therefore not bound by the same regulations.51 
Several UN documents provide information about the so-called ‘zero-tolerance’ policy 
towards sexual abuse and exploitation, with the Zeid Report serving as the foundational 
document. UN policies and bulletins typically stress the prohibition of any kind of sexual 
relationship between UN personnel (which include but are not specifically limited to 
peacekeepers) and beneficiaries of aid and children, as well as prohibiting any kind of 
transactional sexual relationship.52 However, these general UN policies do little to go beyond 
mentioning general prohibitions and measures installed at the levels of the secretariat, DPKO 
or at Mission level. 
In general, peacekeepers tend to be male. In 2006, of the 71,673 military personnel in 
peacekeeping missions, only 1,034 of them were women.53 As at 31 January 2018, the UN 
had a total 78,376 military personnel, 3,090 of whom were women.54 The presence of a 
disproportionate amount of men in peacekeeping operations leads to a hyper-masculine 
environment where abusive behaviour is often dismissed.55 Thus, the literature frequently 
addresses the issue of problems arising from the male-dominated composition of forces and 
discussions on the role that more gender-balanced forces can play in curbing abuse by 
peacekeepers, as well as increasing the reporting of crimes. Since the early 1990s, UN 
missions in countries including Bosnia, Haiti, Mozambique, Kosovo and Cambodia 
demonstrated that peacekeeping missions increase the demand for prostitutes.56 Increased 
education and training as well a more gender-balanced force has been put forward to help 
address these challenges. A significant body of the literature on peacekeeping and sexual 
misconduct questions the potential role that increased female peacekeepers could play. The 
reasoning behind an increased female contingent is that local women are more likely to 
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confide in female peacekeepers and local woman also more likely to become involved in 
community peacebuilding initiatives.57 
The prohibition of transactional sexual relationships has also resulted in an academic debate 
on the use of prostitutes and sex workers during peacekeeping operations, the prohibition of 
which – according to Defeis – is not generally supported by peacekeepers, who tend to be 
predominantly male.58 However, the role that prostitutes can play to curb sexual violence by 
peacekeepers is not a focus area in this research, despite its potential for future academic 
discussion. 
The literature also identifies some of the causes of peacekeeper sexual misconduct. 
Underlying issues identified include cultures of impunity and hyper-masculinity amongst 
peacekeepers;59 suppression of whistle-blowers and resisting external investigations;60 
immunity from prosecution of peacekeepers by the host nation;61 exclusive jurisdiction for 
prosecution by the TCC;62 and, the inability for some TCCs to conduct courts-martial on 
site.63 These are all significant challenges that must be adequately addressed in order to 
prevent ongoing sexual predation. 
There is also a number of articles that refer to the legal framework and legal questions of 
accountability surrounding crimes of a sexual nature committed by peacekeepers.64 The 
question of accountability is one of the key issues that raises challenges as the UN has created 
a comprehensive set of rules governing the conduct of peacekeeping personnel. The 
disciplinary processes and regulations, however, vary by mission and rank.65 Additionally, 
legal scholars have argued that the documents that comprise the UN’s zero tolerance 
framework do not accurately mirror international legal standards regarding crimes of a sexual 
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nature.66 This is exacerbated by the fact that TCCs are individually responsible for their 
troops’ conduct and discipline.67 The pursuit of legal accountability is also hindered by the 
UN’s characterisation of certain crimes as ‘sexual abuse’, a term which is not recognised in 
international criminal law.68 
However, despite institutional limitations that prevented the recommendations of the Zeid 
Report from being implemented fully, it is worth noting that since 2007 the general trend was 
that the number of reported SEA incidents was declining. Some arguments for the decline in 
reported sexual misconduct included references to a higher likelihood of punishment for 
perpetrators as an effective deterrent. NGOs such Code Blue Campaign also undertake 
significant research on the issue of peacekeeper misconduct, with a focus on ending 
peacekeeper impunity.69 
1.3.2. South Africa and Sexual Misconduct in Peace Missions 
Some of the larger TCCs for MONUSCO, where SEA crimes are currently most prevalent, 
such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, are not identified as major perpetrators of SEA crimes in 
UN data. However, South Africa as a single TCC has the highest proportion of SEA 
allegations against its personnel, which suggests that sexual misconduct is not committed by 
all peace mission personnel at similar rates. This is what motivates this study’s specific focus 
on South African personnel as perpetrators of the SEA.  
Compared to the available literature on sexual misconduct by UN peacekeepers in general, 
there is far less literature available which focuses on South Africa’s attempts at dealing with 
misconduct from its personnel. South Africa’s contributions to multilateral peacekeeping 
operations have degenerated resulting in a reputation for their ill-discipline which although 
having been given renewed attention in media reporting,70 is not a contemporary issue. 
According to Neethling, between 2002 and 2006, South African peacekeepers were found 
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guilty of over 1,000 instances of misconduct and 230 criminal offenses for drunkenness, 
absence without leave, disobeying lawful commands, assault, theft, murder and rape.71 
Karim and Beardsley, for example, note that South Africa is identified as having the highest 
SEA allegations of all the TCCs and their military personnel have also suffered allegations of 
rape outside of UN missions.72 
There is a lack of literature specifically regarding analysis of South Africa’s poorly 
disciplined peacekeepers. Much of the academic focus is on the foreign policy objectives that 
South Africa can achieve through its participation in peacekeeping initiatives on the African 
continent.73 This study intends to address this paucity in the literature. Local media 
publications reported on allegations of misconduct by South African peacekeeping personnel 
across all missions in which they have participated for the past 19 years: 
“When the UN report was released in 2015, South Africa was found to be 
the worst offender of all UN peacekeeping nations. The report focused on 
offences in the [DRC], Sudan, South Sudan, Liberia and Haiti. South 
Africa had more than 2 000 troops stationed in the DRC, Sudan and South 
Sudan, according to media reports at the time.”74 
Thus, although there exists a significant body of literature on the subject of peacekeeper 
sexual misconduct, most of the literature consulted is not informed by a theoretical 
framework other than examining gender theory-related dynamics. Even less of the literature 
has a direct focus on TCC’s and the specific role thereof in preventing personnel from 
engaging in sexually predatory behaviour against civilians. This is especially concerning the 
TCC who is primarily responsible for the conduct of those whom they deploy to form part of 
UN missions. As such, this study aims address this gap in the literature by applying a 
constructivist theoretical lens to explore the deficiencies in the preventative methods 
undertaken by South Africa, the largest African TCC in the DRC. 
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1.4. Evidence and Methods 
A theoretical case study approach is utilised in this study and is underpinned by 
Constructivism, especially in relation to norm creation and internalisation. 
This study draws on academic material in the form of academic journals books, non-
governmental organisation reports, UN documents and policies, South African governmental 
documents, as well as local and international news outlets.75 To a lesser extent, the study also 
makes use of available data on reported allegations of misconduct housed in the UN Conduct 
website database,76 which was limited to SEA offences committed by South African peace 
keepers and UN police personnel – it also includes data on where the affiliation of the 
perpetrator was not specified.77 Where relevant and available, case file data from medical 
clinics, hospitals and legal offices, interview-sourced data from investigations and population 
based NGO surveys was referred to. 
The UN’s Conduct in Field Missions website provides a detailed online database on 
allegations against UN personnel but is limited in that it does not provide information 
regarding allegations prior to 2007 or against civilian personnel deployed as part of 
peacekeeping missions.78 Because of the data limitations, allegations for MONUC will be 
limited and more focus will be given to MONUSCO, which took over from MONUC in 
2010, after receiving its mandate through SC/RES/1925.79  
The SEA dataset only includes data on reported allegations, which the UN has defined as 
“uncorroborated information pointing to the possible occurrence of misconduct.”80 This will 
further be narrowed down to allegations against military, police and unspecified personnel in 
MONUC and MONUSCO. Although the paper will focus on troop contributing countries in 
UN missions and their respective preventative measures, it is important to note that UN 
records on SEA allegations including the nationality of the alleged perpetrator only date back 
to 2015. However, it was only in 2015 that the nationality of alleged perpetrators was 
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disclosed. Non-disclosure of nationality in UN data is an action that has precedent in the 2004 
OIOS investigations in Bunia, DRC,81 for fear of embarrassing or isolating states on whom 
they are dependent on military, police and equipment contributions. 
Other sources of data that provide context on the extent of civilian predation in the DRC 
includes NGO produced population based-surveys, which are not immune from their inherent 
biases of being dependent on crises for their existence which may result in potential over 
exaggeration or over reporting. There is also case file data from medical clinics, hospitals and 
legal offices, however, this is less readily accessible due to confidentiality requirements. 
Generally, there are limitations in any data concerning sexual abuse stating that it may be 
over or underreported. Sexual violence in the Congo, and elsewhere, is generally 
underreported,82 therefore, it follows that those incidents committed by peacekeepers may 
also be especially underreported due to their positions of authority. The reliability of data 
may also be compromised by double-count related over-reporting – where the same 
individuals are counted multiple times by various researchers or agencies.83 Other limitations 
that skews the data include a disproportionate focus on female victims and an inherent 
selection bias based on where non-UN sourced data on rapes are sourced.84 
Notwithstanding questions surrounding the reliability of the available data on sexual violence 
in the DRC, this limited data is still important in an evaluation of the preventative measures 
at state and institutional level. 
It is important to note that there is a number of limitations in the available information for 
this research. The most significant limitations relate to the data itself, which is of limited 
availability as it relies on self-reporting which may bring into question the reliability of the 
information provided. Even in the instance of allegations that have been reported, it is 
difficult for many of these allegations to be corroborated either due to the inability of 
authorities to track down the victim or perpetrator, or the absence of witnesses due to the 
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nature of sexual crimes.85 However, these concerns are addressed by case file data and 
reports from medical personnel, who can confirm whether the injuries sustained by the victim 
are consistent with their reported assault. 
Reports of sexual assault and exploitation may also be over and under-reported given the 
personal circumstances of the victim. Although a significant amount of the data used comes 
from the UN Conduct database, the database only contains incidents of misconduct that have 
been reported. This may skew the data as there are numerous reasons why the rate of 
reporting may change at any given period; for instance, an increased interest in the subject 
matter may be confused for in an increase in incidents.86 Further, it is possible that victims 
could have fabricated incidents of assault in order to gain access to limited medical resources. 
Information sourced from activists, NGOs and directly from victims might be inaccurate as 
they might overemphasise or exaggerate in order to fuel certain perceptions that result in 
increased aid or external intervention.87 
While much of the data does not report specific information on the victims, there is likely to 
be a gendered bias in the data, which will likely exclude male victims. More information is 
readily available on women and children who have been subject to abuse. Additionally, it is 
difficult to attribute changes in the data to policy interventions, as there may be multiple 
reasons why incidents of misconduct may increase or decrease. 
This research will primarily focus on South African peacekeeping personnel as alleged 
perpetrators of SEA crimes. However, the UN only began keeping data on the nationality of 
perpetrators in 2015, which most peacekeeping missions predate. Additionally, it is difficult 
to assess the reliability of these claims against certain nationalities. 
1.5. Chapter Outline 
In order to address the proposed research question in a logical manner, the following three 
chapters discuss the theoretical framework, context and case study. Conclusions about why 
certain interventions have failed to yield the desired resultswill then be generated from the 
evidence presented in the literature and documents consulted. 
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Chapter 2 explores Constructivism as the analytical framework of this research, with a focus 
on the creation and internalisation of international norms. Chapter 3 discusses the context 
surrounding sexual misconduct within UN peacekeeping missions and the policies drawn up 
by the UN to address instances of misconduct. 
Chapter 4 will examine South African peacekeeping personnel in MONUC and MONUSCO, 
providing a background to South Africa’s involvement and its SEA policy framework. 
Thereafter, Chapter 5 explores, in greater depth, the preventative and punitive practices 
employed by South African authorities to address sexual misconduct in MONUC and 
MONUSCO. Finally, Chapter 6 draws conclusions and presents recommendations. 
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2. Theoretical framework: Norms in Constructivism 
2.1. Introduction 
This study is underpinned by a Constructivist theoretical framework. One of the key 
principles of Constructivist thinking is that actors create meaning for and with others in the 
context of particular social and historical contexts and systems. The actions of actors in the 
international system, and their relations with each other, are informed by practices and norms, 
and it is these norms that give actions and behaviour meaning.88 In other words, meaning is 
determined by interactions that create the social structures through which identities and 
interests, informed by practices and norms, are defined.89  
The exploration of the main political dynamics that occur when dealing with sexual 
misconduct perpetrated by UN-affiliated personnel during UN peace missions will thus be 
approached from a constructivist position. In order to analyse the development, 
implementation and internalisation of norms towards behaviour change, the Norm Life Cycle 
is utilised as the analytical framework of this research.90  
This chapter aims to unpack and delve more deeply into the Norm Life Cycle, with a specific 
focus on norm internalisation. 
All actors within the international system have identities that they acquire through the 
collective meaning derived from participation in structures, which organise actions 
undertaken.91 Identities demonstrate the ideals and preferences of a state and states reproduce 
their identities through social practice, although they can control how this identity is 
perceived by other states.92 Therefore, identities are important because they are not viewed as 
fixed; a state’s identity can evolve as its interests do and an actor can have many identities 
simultaneously depending on their context.93 In some instances, states may embrace certain 
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norms and shape their identities around them as a means of international legitimation 
following domestic political changes.94 
Constructivists also consider the importance of the roles of institutions, which are stable sets 
of interests and identities, as products of the perceptions and socialisation of actors.95 
Socialisation results in social practice that produces and reproduces identities and interests 
that shape state behaviour that results in predictability that leads to order.96 Based on its focus 
on ideas and norms, Constructivism provides an analytical framework of state behaviour in 
the context of the international norms that underpin or determine appropriate behaviour in the 
international system. Additionally, Constructivism entails the inclusion of domestic politics 
and culture as they are significant contributors to a state’s identity and subsequently 
behaviour.97 Constructivism is additionally a relevant analytical lens for the topic of peace 
missions; peace missions can serve as instruments of norm diffusion or maintenance and 
promotion of existing norms.98  
2.2. The Norm Life Cycle 
Finnemore and Sikkink proposed what they named the Norm Life Cycle, a three-stage 
process that demonstrates how norms emerge and evolve until they have reached a status 
within the international community where their existence is perceived to be natural.99 As this 
cycle will form an integral part of the analytical framework for this paper, it is worth 
discussion.  
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Figure 3: The Norm Life Cycle (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). 
2.2.1. Norm Emergence 
The first stage of the cycle is Norm Emergence.100 This begins with actors, who are classified 
as norm entrepreneurs that build norms based on views about what behaviour is considered 
acceptable or ideal in their community.101 These actors are vital during this stage; through 
discourse creation and framing, they are able to that draw attention an issue. The framing and 
language used to develop new norms becomes critical due to the fact that norms do not 
emerge in isolation but rather must compete with existing, and sometimes contrary, norms, in 
order to overhaul them and establish new patterns of accepted or appropriate behaviour.102 At 
this stage, norm entrepreneurs are limited in the tools at their disposal and rely strongly on 
persuasion motivated by “empathy, altruism, and ideational commitment” as well as their 
own personal or communal interests to garner support for their developing norm.103  
Because we are discussing international norms, norms must move from beyond the domestic 
arena of the norm entrepreneur to the international arena. This is done most effectively 
through organisational platforms such as non-governmental or inter-governmental 
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international organisations.104 While some organisations have been established explicitly for 
promoting a specific norm, for example, Greenpeace and its promotion of environmental 
conservation, many norm entrepreneurs utilise standing international organisations that exist 
to fulfil a multitude of purposes, such as the UN.105 It is important to remain conscious of the 
fact that the structures of organisations like the UN have an inherent influence on the kinds of 
norms that it endorses due to its Charter, such as sovereignty and human rights protection.106 
Organisations are able to promote or discredit the proliferation of certain norms due the 
expertise of its professionals and the information generation capacity of its bureaucracy; 
experts with access to government officials are able to utilise information at their disposal to 
influence the formulation of government policy, which may promote an emerging norm.107 
This is an important factor, as norm entrepreneurs need the support of states to endorse, 
promote, and socialise their norms.108 Thus, IGOs are more effective than coalitions of 
NGOs, which rely on persuasion only, due to the advantages that IGOs have over smaller, 
developing states.109  
Often, for an emergent norm to progress to the Norm Cascade stage of the cycle, the norm 
needs to acquire a critical mass of support from states, which can be achieved if the norm 
becomes institutionalised. Institutionalisation often takes place through the rules of 
multilateral organisations, bilateral foreign policies and the ascension of norms to the status 
of international law.110 Although institutionalisation is not a precondition for Norm Cascade, 
it strengthens the likelihood of Norm Cascade by specifying what constitutes appropriate 
behaviour or violations thereof; however, institutionalisation can also occur as a consequence 
of a Norm Cascade.111 
When a norm has been adopted by a critical mass of states, it reaches a threshold called the 
tipping point. According to Finnemore and Sikkink, the tipping point is reached when the 
norm is adopted by one third of the states in the system, although which states adopt the norm 
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is also of influential.112 States whose buy in is necessary for adoption of a norm include states 
“without which the achievement of the substantive norm goal is compromised” and states that 
have “a certain moral stature.”113 The concept of critical mass is often present in international 
treaty law where treaties require a specific number or proportion of state signatories to ratify 
the treaty before it enters into force.114 However, this is not to say that ascension to the status 
of international law is all encompassing, due to the consent basis of treaty-based law and the 
lack of a supranational body able to enforce such laws.  
2.2.2. Norm Cascade 
After a norm has reached the tipping point, the norm enters the second stage of the cycle, 
Norm Cascade, where the norm is broadly accepted by states or “bandwagoning” occurs.115 
At this stage, domestic pressure for norm adoption is no longer necessary and international 
socialisation becomes the driving force behind norm adoption.116 Within international 
socialisation, states encourage others to adopt norms through diplomatic support or 
punishment; international organisations and norm entrepreneur networks also facilitate the 
process by pressuring actors to join and ratify treaties.117 For socialisation to occur, states 
must be sufficiently motivated to adopt a norm, which can be linked to the state’s identity, for 
example, as a liberal state, through legitimation, conformity and esteem.118  
International organisations are key sources of legitimation by approving or disapproving of 
the behaviour of states in the international arena, which can ensure compliance with 
international norms and repercussions for noncompliance.119 International legitimation of 
norms also promotes domestic legitimation of norms, which in turn promotes compliance 
with norms by citizens.120 States conform to international norms to show that they belong in 
the global community, especially if other states are conforming to the norm and esteem is 
related to both conformity and legitimacy, in that states wish to be well perceived by their 
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peers, but also relates to how states perceive themselves.121 However, new norms are more 
likely to gain acceptance and legitimacy when they complement and “fit coherently” with 
existing norms.122 
2.2.3. Norm Internalisation 
The final stage of the Norm Life Cycle is Norm Internalisation, where norms are generally 
widely accepted and not considered as topics up for debate, and consequently results in an 
almost unconscious compliance.123 Internalisation, which is a continuation of the Norm 
Cascade and a product of socialisation where a norm is so deeply entrenched that it is 
considered the only appropriate form of behaviour.124 This stage is also referred to as Norm 
Diffusion, which occurs over both stages of Norm Cascade and Norm Internalisation;125 
because of this, the two terms will be used interchangeable in this study. This also highlights 
the overlapping nature of the Norm Cascade and Norm Internalisation stages, especially in 
the absence of objective measurement criteria.  
 Norm Internalisation goes beyond a state adhering to international law due to ‘peer pressure’ 
from other states or state image in the international arena, but that norms become 
consolidated and universal because compliance has become habit through repeated 
behaviour.126 In other words, one can determine when a norm has been internalised when it is 
reproduced in the identity, interests and behaviour of a state.127 Thus, endorsing and adopting 
a norm requires behavioural change in accordance with the norm.128 For example, all states 
are bound by UN Charter to promote and protect human rights; this that been institutionalised 
in the UN Charter as well as other sources of international law. Yet, there are states that 
perpetrate human rights violations against its population. This is because violations of a norm 
do not necessarily make it invalid, nor do they refute it.129 Instead, this may reflect that the 
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state has not been socialised to reproduce the appropriate behaviour and as such, the norm has 
not been internalised. 
Norm Internalisation underlines the importance that actors accept the norm as appropriate for 
themselves and behave accordingly. States acquire an identity – a set of norms – for 
themselves (a self-image) and to project images of themselves.130 Socialisation is necessary 
for internalisation so that external factors such as legitimacy, conformity and self-esteem are 
no longer required to ensure compliance with norms.131 Although scholars such as Krook and 
True argue that the model put forth by Finnemore and Sikkink lacks a coherent explanation 
for why norms may spread but fail to be universally realised or have differing local 
practices.132 To address this, Krook and True argue that by understanding the type of norm, it 
is possible to explain why certain norms are adopted more or better than others. Constitutive 
norms that can define a state’s identity leave little room for contestation, which negatively 
affects their ability to diffuse.133 Regulative norms, on the other hand, which prescribe 
behaviour standards without defining a state’s identity, are more easily diffused due to their 
room for adaption.134 
2.2.4. The Political Dynamics of Norm Internalisation and Peace Missions 
In their conduct, peace mission personnel are supposed to reflect behaviour consistent with 
the normative frameworks that underpin their missions. This is of additional importance 
because international organisations (IOs) play a key role in spreading norms;135 therefore, 
UN peace missions can serve as an avenue of norm diffusion.136 One of these norms concerns 
the impermissibility of sexual exploitation or abuse of women. The protection of women 
from sexual violence may be a relatively new norm on its own; but it also fits into a cluster of 
more established norms such as the protection of civilians and human security. It was only in 
1998 with introduction of the Rome Statute that the issue gained widespread international 
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importance, following decades of advocacy from human rights and women’s rights 
organisations.137 
Given the role of the UN as a key organisational platform that spreads norms to its member 
states, as well as it’s expressed commitments to the norms that state that sexual abuse or 
exploitation of women is not appropriate, these commitments should be reflected in its 
behaviour during its peace missions. 
For instance, senior UN and government officials have generally accepted norms against 
transaction sex in conflict and post-conflict environments, yet the behaviour of peace mission 
personnel does not reflect the appropriate normative behaviour despite broad educational 
programmes; some personnel have evenly openly rejecting the UN’s zero-tolerance policy.138 
This disconnection between norm acceptance within bureaucratic structures and personnel in 
the field, especially when concerning appropriate sexual conduct, is one of the elements that 
this study seeks to explain by looking at Norm Internalisation. However, Norm 
Internalisation must be considered within the unique political dynamic of peace missions. In 
peacekeeping missions, military and police contingents form the bulk of the personnel; these 
contingents are deployed by their states who maintain the responsibility of ensuring that their 
personnel behave in accordance to UN standards of conduct. 
This may raise the question of why states would participate in these missions if they are 
bound by external standards. According to the literature, there are five general justifications 
for why states contribute to a peacekeeping operation: political, economic, security, 
institutional and normative.139 These justifications are informed by several factors, including 
domestic or foreign policy considerations or resource constraints, and they are not mutually 
exclusive.  
In their conduct, peacekeeping personnel are supposed to reflect behaviour consistent with 
the normative frameworks that underpin their missions. However, the acceptance of norms 
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regarding peacekeeping has been inconsistent. For instance, senior UN and government 
officials have generally accepted norms against transactional sex in conflict and post-conflict 
environments, yet peacekeepers themselves have not accepted the norm despite broad 
educational programmes, with some openly rejecting it.140  
The extent of the occurrence of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) incidents in 
peacekeeping missions suggests that socialisation alone has failed to produce compliance 
with international norms around SEA crimes.141 When international norms have been 
appropriately socialised by states, this reflects in their behaviour. One way that this 
socialisation can be pursued is through states’ ability to create and enforce rules regarding the 
conduct of their personnel in line with the international norms that they must comply with 
when they participate in UN peace missions.142 Thus, peacekeeper misconduct can reflect the 
inability of a state to enforce international norms through domestic socialisation by failing to 
produce behaviour consistent with the norm. 
It is at this point that we must demonstrate how we will explore the political dynamics 
between the UN and its troop-contributing countries (TCCs) when it comes to Norm 
Internalisation in peace missions. Although there are no objective measurement criteria to 
determine Norm Internalisation, this study will use Gilardi’s four mechanisms of norm 
diffusion (coercion, competition, learning and emulation),143 which will explain the various 
ways in which Norm Internalisation can take place. It is important to note that while the body 
of Gilardi’s work relates to policy diffusion at the state-level, his four categories of diffusion 
in this respect can be adapted to the process of norm internalisation where it discusses the 
dynamics between IOs and states. These categories will provide the analytical framework to 
evaluate the process of Norm Internalisation in subsequent chapters of this research. 
2.2.4.1. Coercion 
The first way in which a state can adopt and internalise a norm is through coercion. In this 
instance, international organisations like the UN as well as powerful states, can apply 
pressure on other states in order to adopt norms. Coercion often takes place through the 
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mechanism of conditionality; conditions are set as preconditions for assistance in exchange 
for adopting certain norms.144  
Coercion is especially popular with international financial institutions (IFIs) like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, who attach certain conditions – which 
are often policy related and not normative, although the two are not mutually exclusive – as 
preconditions for financial assistance.145 Regional IGOs like the European Union (EU) also 
have conditions attached to membership. For example, member states must align their 
domestic practices and political institutions with the values of the EU in order to become 
members.146 
However, conditionality as a method of coercion does not always yield the desired results. In 
the case of IFIs, some states that are dependent on their financial assistance do not implement 
the required reforms. Furthermore, while the EU makes use “reinforcement by reward” in 
order to coerce prospective members to adopt its liberal democratic norms and values, the 
cost of compliance in countries like Turkey or Serbia outweigh the prospective benefits of 
membership.147 
2.2.4.2. Competition 
The second method of internalisation is competition, which refers to countries adopting or 
adapting certain behaviours as a response to, or in anticipation of, the behaviour of other 
states.148 This category is largely rooted in notions of domestic economic practices and 
international economic interdependence. Although IOs do not play a significant role in this 
category, it is still worth noting that states can influence other states to adopt behaviour 
regarding protection of the environment of labour relations based on their commercial 
relations with other states that have higher levels of environmental or labour protections.149 
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2.2.4.3. Learning 
States can also adopt new norms through a process of learning, where the experiences of 
other states is used to gauge the consequences of behavioural changes in line with a change in 
beliefs.150 States typically learn from other states who have already adopted the beliefs and 
behaviours under their consideration, which can then be compared with their own experience, 
their experience of those in their region, and the experience of the entire world.151 This 
process of learning is understood to be a rational process where the gains of norm adoption 
and behavioural change are weighed against the experiences of states who already behave 
accordingly. 
According to research conducted on this subject, member states of an IGO are more likely to 
adopt behaviours if there is evidence – or the perception – that other states who already 
subscribe to a given norm have derived benefits from it.152 However, learning is not always 
perfect. Decision-makers are restricted by their ideological positions and domestic political 
considerations.153 Furthermore, learning is more likely to be used to advance the interests of 
decision-makers, instead of to abide by appropriate standards of behaviour. 
2.2.4.4. Emulation 
Emulation is the final process through which internalisation can occur. In emulation, 
behaviour and beliefs spread not due their inherent characteristics but because of the 
“normative and socially constructed properties” that they hold.154 
In our discussion of Norm Internalisation, emulation is perhaps the most important method of 
diffusion, especially due to the role that IOs can play herein. The actions of political actors 
are guided primarily by what is considered appropriate within that organisation; unlike in 
coercion, competition and learning where actions are driven by consequences and domestic 
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gain.155 Thus, the “logic of appropriateness” that drives the behaviour of organisations is also 
responsible for determining identities and roles.156  
These identities and roles can be determined through three socialisation processes, where 
socialisation refers to the “process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given 
community.”157 First, by strategic calculations that can lead to long-term preference changes 
and second, through role-playing where roles are adopted in certain settings without full norm 
internalisation.158 Strategic calculations can involve social and material incentives to produce 
sustained behavioural changes; however, strategic calculations must operate in conjunction 
with other socialisation mechanisms, without which it is relegated to a means of coercion or 
competition.159  
Role-playing as a means of socialisation sees actors “act in accordance with expectations – 
irrespective of whether they like the role or agree with it.”160 It becomes a useful shortcut 
when cost-benefit calculations are not practical or possible, the organisational environment 
already has prescriptive roles that a state can simply adopt when they are in that setting.161 
Because role-playing is easier in institutional settings than constantly calculating the strategic 
value of behaving in a certain way, it is possible for roles to evolve unconsciously into habits 
with a taken-for-granted status.162 When an actor moves from role-playing to believing that it 
is the ‘right thing to do’, the taken-for-granted status that characterises the far end of Norm 
Internalisation is achieved.163  
The third socialisation process, which arguably leads to full norm internalisation, is 
normative suasion. This is where actors come to change their beliefs and understanding of 
what is appropriate through persuasion and interactions with others.164 Through normative 
suasion, a state fully internalises a norm or standard of appropriateness through a belief that it 
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is the right thing to do. Talking and arguments become the primary tools of persuasion, 
especially in international organisations.165 
These three socialisation processes should not be considered as a linear process as 
internalisation can occur because of all three processes. Additionally, internationalisation 
does not occur in a vacuum and IOs are more than organisational platforms but also act as 
promoters and sites of socialisation in public arenas.166 Therefore, it is through this process of 
socialisation – a component of emulation – that norms can become internalised. Other 
processes like learning may play a role initially, but become less important the more 
internalised the norm becomes.167 While emulation as a means towards Norm Internalisation 
and the political dynamics that occur within emulation are key to the analysis of this research, 
it is conceded that there exists no methodological consensus on how to measure emulation in 
general terms and can only be considered on a case-by-case basis.168 
2.3. Summary 
Generally, there are four broad ways in which internalisation of norms and behaviour change 
can occur, these categories are not fixed, and states may adopt multiple of these methods 
simultaneously depending on the nature of the norms and beliefs under consideration. A 
common underlying thread in these processes is that whether through coercion, learning or 
competition, states usually adopt norms and behave accordingly when there is something for 
them to gain.  
It is only through emulation, where actions are guided by appropriateness standards set by 
IOs that more than self-interest motivate states, although this is not to say that self-interest 
and normative considerations cannot coexist – as is demonstrated by the five justifications for 
peace mission contribution by Bellamy and Williams.169 While emulation is the method 
through which the internalisation of international norms occurs, other processes such as 
learning or coercion may still occur, especially within the first two stages of the Norm Life 
Cycle.  
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Regarding the topic of this research specifically, the process of emulation shapes the political 
dynamics of the relationship between UN and TCCs where the UN determines what is 
considered appropriate and TCCs must comply. When the appropriate behaviour is not 
displayed, as has been the case, we can look at the underlying socialisation processes of 
emulation to determine why. 
Although not all of the abovementioned processes are relevant to this research as the focus 
henceforth will be on emulation, it is still important to understand the mechanisms through 
which norms can be internalised if any meaningful analysis is to be conducted.  
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3. The UN, MONUC, MONUSCO and sexual misconduct 
3.1. Introduction 
Across these missions, peace personnel have allegedly participated in soliciting prostitutes, 
using child prostitutes, sex trafficking, having sex with children, and fathering children with 
local women and then abandoning them.170 The occurrences of transactional and exploitative 
sexual relationships as well as sexual abuse, takes place in the unique context of peace 
missions by personnel who enjoy immunity and privileges in the undertaking of actions in 
their official capacity.171 Peace missions are increasingly abused by their personnel, who 
create new demands for human trafficking and sex work. The UN and its agencies addressed 
these atrocities through policies and guidelines.172 Despite these efforts, the occurrences of 
SEA across peace missions not only continue to occur but vary greatly across the different 
missions; this may suggest that SEA is not an “inevitable by-product of multinational 
peacekeeping,” 173 but is instead influenced by mission-specific factors. 
Initial assumptions by journalists, policymakers and academics were that women and children 
willingly engaged in sexual activities with peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel in 
exchange for food, money or shelter. However, this largely ignored incidents where women 
were coerced by peace mission personnel into performing sex acts, as was highlighted in 
investigations and reports into the conduct from the early 2000s.174 Continued revelations of 
the exploitative sexual practices of peace mission personnel prompted a UN response that 
culminated in, what is now known as, the zero-tolerance policy.  
This chapter will provide an overview of sexual misconduct by peace personnel and the 
major documents, frameworks and reports that comprise the UN’s zero-tolerance policy. The 
chapter will conclude with how the UN has implemented recommendations and provisions 
generally and within MONUC and MONUSCO. 
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3.2. MONUC and MONUSCO: An overview 
The UN and NGO personnel have reported the commission of SEA incidents in peacekeeping 
missions since the early 1990s. This study will focus on incidents occurring within MONUC 
and MONUSCO between 1999 and 2018, especially given the crucial role played by the 
DRC in shaping the UN’s zero-tolerance policy.  
The DRC has a very complex history of conflict. As early as the 1960s, it played host to the 
United Nations Mission in the Congo (ONUC). These conflicts escalated following the 
country’s independence from Belgium. However, the specific complexities of the DRC’s 
history of conflict is beyond the scope of this paper. That being said, the 1990s are a 
significant period in this history due to the involvement of many regional actors in the 
conflict that necessitated UN intervention in an attempt to sustain the fragile peace that 
existed. 
In 1999, MONUC was established as a peacekeeping mission with the adoption of UNSC 
resolution S/RES/1279 (1999) to monitor the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement between the DRC, 
Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, to disengage forces, and liaise between 
them, as well as facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.175 It was initially deployed in line 
with Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which largely required observers, but was expanded in 
2000 in line with Chapter VII, permitting the use of force under certain considerations, 
including the protection of civilians from violence.176 Following the election of Joseph 
Kabila in 2006, MONUC remained in place with a more robust mandate, including capacity 
building and the resolution of newer conflicts in a number of the provinces of the DRC.177 
MONUC was thus a blend of a peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding mission, but 
will hereinafter be referred to as a peacekeeping mission for the sake of argument. 
In 2004, the Independent, a British newspaper, reported allegations of widespread sexual 
misconduct by the UN’s personnel in Bunia. In the Independent’s article, half of the over 30 
girls interviewed  said that they engaged in sexual activities with peacekeepers out of 
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desperation in exchange for basic supplies in their internally displaced persons (IDP) 
camp.178 Teenaged girls who had infants as a product of being raped in their villages by 
combatants prior to entering IDP camps were dependent on transactional sex with 
peacekeepers due to their social isolation for having children while being unwed;179 these 
interactions were largely for money, food and jobs.180 Additionally, girls with whom DPKO 
officials spoke noted that peacekeepers also engaged in “rape disguised as prostitution”, 
where peacekeepers would rape them and then provide them with food or money to make it 
look like the interaction was transactional.181 Peacekeepers used boys and young men in the 
camps as intermediaries to facilitate these sexual encounters in exchange for food.182 
Peacekeepers were able to take advantage of girls sexually and avoid punishment because of 
the girls’ unwillingness to cooperate with investigators, as many had previously suffered 
abuses at the hands of soldiers and were distrustful of authority figures.183 Other factors that 
contributed to the pervasiveness of the abuse and exploitation of women and children are 
poverty and lack of economic opportunities; breakdowns in familial units from conflict; an 
absence of an effective judicial system; and, a local acceptance of violence against women 
and children. Additionally, there was a culture of impunity among peacekeepers themselves 
fuelled by perceptions of whistle-blower victimisation, a lack of recreational activities, poor 
knowledge of UN conduct standards and perceptions that no action was being or would be 
taken by authorities.184  
Against this background, an OIOS investigation was conducted into 72 SEA allegations in 
Bunia between May and September of 2004 after public outcry and condemnation.185 
However, in addition to the hesitance of victims to cooperate with authorities out of fear, 
many of the allegations were not specific, unsubstantiated or victims were not able to identify 
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alleged perpetrators.186 Despite that, the Secretary-General reported to the UNGA that the 
majority of the allegations – 45 percent of the total – involved sex with children. 
On 28 May 2010, UNSC resolution S/RES/1925 was passed, which saw the creation of 
MONUSCO. This mission was to take over from MONUC. MONUSCO had a more 
comprehensive mission mandate than MONUC, permitting the use of “all necessary means” 
in order to achieve as its top priority “the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and 
human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the [DRC 
Government] in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.”187 Other priority areas of 
MONUSCO’s mandate include providing protection from “all forms of sexual and gender-
based violence” and requesting that MONUSCO is in full compliance with the zero-tolerance 
policy.188 
The trend of overall SEA allegation rates have improved in MONUSCO when compared to 
MONUC despite the absence of new policy interventions after the introduction of 
MONUSCO.189 For example, between 2007 and 2010, there was a total of 193 allegations of 
SEA against all categories of personnel, compared to a total of 149 allegations against 
MONUSCO personnel from 2011 to 2017.190 However, there are several reasons that may 
explain the general decrease, including improved preventative measures, or decreased 
reporting because of intimidation or fear, as opposed to a decrease in actual allegations. 
3.3. United Nations Sexual Exploitation and Abuse policies 
The reporting of widespread sexual misconduct of MONUC personnel in the early 2000s, as 
well as sexual misconduct by peacekeeping and NGO personnel in West Africa around the 
same time, limited the ability of UN missions to achieve their mandates and simultaneously 
tarnished the UN’s reputation. This necessitated an institutional response that became the 
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zero-tolerance policy. Key documents include the 2003 Secretary-General Bulletin 
ST/SGB/2003/13 and the 2005 Zeid Report. Rule 4 of the UN Ten Rules: Code of Personal 
Conduct of Blue Helmets, applicable to peacekeeping personnel or ‘blue helmets’, also 
prohibits “immoral acts of sexual, physical or psychological abuse or exploitation”.191 Thus, 
the ultimate goal of these UN policies is to ensure that all personnel in peacekeeping missions 
comply with an appropriate standard of behaviour that is consistent with the values of the UN 
by not committing acts of SEA. 
The focus on this section will be from the 2003 issuing of Bulletin ST/SGB/2003/13 
onwards, with recognition of previous actions undertaken by the UN through reports and 
resolutions that in part addressed the topic of sexual exploitation. However, the Bulletin 
represents the first time a document was drafted that was explicitly concerned with 
combatting SEA, which is why it has been selected as the starting point for the contemporary 
zero tolerance  policy. 
3.3.1. Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual 
Abuse  
Section 3 of Bulletin ST/SGB/2003/13 clearly states, “[sexual] exploitation and sexual abuse 
violate universally recognised international legal norms and standards and have always been 
unacceptable behaviour and prohibited conduct”.192 The Bulletin also specifies six 
obligations of UN staff that outline activities, including the prohibition of sexual acts with 
children, transactional sexual relationships, and relationships with aid beneficiaries as well as 
the obligation to report suspected sexual abuse or exploitation and maintain an environment 
that prevents the occurrences of such acts.193 Section 3.2(a) of the Bulletin also notes that 
SEA activities constitute “serious misconduct” that warrant disciplinary measures.194  
The Bulletin specifies that Heads of UN Missions are responsible for ensuring that their 
environment is conducive to preventing SEA and they must notify their staff of the provisions 
of the bulletin as well as take the appropriate actions in cases where these provisions have 
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been violated.195 The Mission Head is responsible for appointing an official to receive 
complaints and informing the local population and UN personnel of how to contact this 
person.196 The Mission is also required to report any investigations and actions taken as a 
result thereof to the Department of Management; where sufficient evidence supports SEA 
allegations, cases may also be referred to national prosecution authorities after consultation 
with the UN’s Office of Legal Affairs.197 Cooperative arrangements with entities that are not 
within the UN system, such as NGOs, are also bound by these measures and failure to 
comply with the provisions or appropriately investigate allegations is grounds for termination 
of the arrangement.198 
This Bulletin demonstrates that there was a process put in place in order to address instances 
of SEA in peacekeeping missions, despite the lack of clarity surrounding investigative 
processes and the range of punishments at their disposal. The Bulletin is also vague regarding 
what specific actions can realistically be implemented to maintain an environment that 
prevents abuses, nor does it address the roles of TCCs or make reference to the MOU’s that 
underpin the relationship between the UN and TCCs. The absence of references to national 
contingents is because the Bulletin does not apply to all categories of personnel; it is 
applicable only to UN staff who are under the administrative authority of the Secretary-
General.199 It is therefore not surprising that in 2004, a year after the Bulletin was published, 
there were more revelations of widespread SEA allegations by peacekeepers in the DRC.  
3.3.2. Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping 
Operations in all their Aspects 
The investigation conducted by Prince Zeid in 2004 and its subsequent recommendations was 
in direct response to the failure of Bulletin ST/SGB/2003/13 to address the problem of SEA 
in peacekeeping missions effectively. To contrast, Bulletin ST/SGB/2003/13 was three pages 
long in its entirety while Prince Zeid’s more comprehensive review and strategy was 41 
pages in length. The Zeid Report was an important step towards addressing the issue of SEA 
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in peacekeeping because it acknowledged the scope of the problem, the failings of previous 
frameworks as well as the need for a “radical change” in the way that the UN addresses SEA 
in peacekeeping operations due to the inadequacy of existing strategies.200  
In order to prevent SEA, there has to be an understanding of what some of its underlying 
causes are, which Prince Zeid and his team attempted to identify in the course of their 
investigation. According to the Zeid Report, one of the underlying causes stems from an 
inability of peacekeepers to fully recognise the extent to which the societies in which they 
operate are “traumatised” and “vulnerable”.201  
The report identifies a number of key areas that must be addressed in order to achieve a more 
effective policy on preventing and addressing sexual misconduct by peacekeeping personnel 
in general. The first is the issue of different standards of conduct which apply to different 
classes of personnel (civilian, military, police, contractors and volunteers), which the Zeid 
Report terms as a “serious shortcoming” of Bulletin ST/SGB/2003/13.202 While most 
categories of personnel are bound by UN standards in one way or another, members of 
national contingents, which comprise all military personnel, were only bound by rules that 
were agreed to by their TCC.203 The Zeid Report recommended that the standards of the 
Bulletin be made applicable to all categories of personnel and the provisions should be issued 
in a convenient form in the languages of contingents.204 
The Zeid Report also identified issues regarding the allegation investigative processes, most 
notably that evidence collected in preliminary investigations was often insufficient for use 
under their national law or for courts martial. In addition, TCCs seldom received complete 
documentation following investigations due to the “policy of not releasing documents that 
might be used by third parties to make claims against the [UN].”205 The actual investigative 
process was also seen as repetitive. Recommendations to this effect included a more 
streamlined investigative process, undertaken by professionals with access to modern 
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forensic methods where the cases are not straightforward, and the participation of a TCC 
representative to ensure admissibility of evidence in national legal proceedings.206 
Better measures of organisational accountability were also recommended, including 
increasing awareness raising campaigns to ensure that all personnel know that acts of SEA as 
outlined in the Bulletin are prohibited and extensive pre- and post-deployment training. The 
Zeid Report also recommended the establishment of communal outreach programmes to 
ensure that local populations are aware of the zero-tolerance policy and the reporting 
mechanisms available to them as well the deployment of more women in peacekeeping 
missions. The DPKO was recommended not to only track allegations but also the responses 
to those allegations in order to prevent perpetrators from being re-deployed in future, as well 
as the establishment of a dedicated misconduct mechanism within the DPKO.207  
The Zeid Report identified that the lack of suitable recreational activities for personnel could 
result in them participating in prohibited activities out of boredom. Thus, the provision of 
paid rest, family visits, counsellors, and sports, internet and phone access could increase staff 
welfare and reduce the occurrence of misconduct born from personnel having little to do in 
their idle time.208 
Noting that the UN has a limited ability to discipline all categories of peacekeeping 
personnel, the Zeid Report recommended that those who are found to have committed acts of 
SEA have their contracts terminated and be fined or have their payments withheld, with the 
proceeds going to a Victims’ Trust Fund. The purpose of the fund is to assist victims, such as 
first-aid medical treatment, follow-up support from relief and aid agencies, as well as 
providing the victims with feedback on the outcome of investigations and the establishment 
of a victims’ trust fund.209 
The Zeid Report also recommended that the MOUs be amended to require national 
contingents comply with local laws, despite their immunity as per the SOFA with the host 
nation, and for TCCs to forward cases to their national prosecuting authorities where there is 
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evidence to support misconduct that constitutes a crime.210 The report also recommended that 
implementation of SEA preventative measures be included in performance evaluations of 
members of senior management, and that senior military staff and contingent commanders 
are assessed on their ability to uphold and implement preventative and combative policies.211 
While the key documents that underpin the zero-tolerance policy detail a process for 
accountability in cases of SEA, all of these policies and recommendations are restricted by 
MOUs and SOFAs. The MOUs and SOFAs are legal provisions that make national 
contingents immune from prosecution in the host state and ascribe sole jurisdiction for 
criminal prosecution to TCCs.212 Thus, while the UN may repatriate peacekeeping personnel 
to their countries of origin, they have no ability to ensure that perpetrators are prosecuted,213 
even if TCCs are obligated to do so. 
3.3.3. Amended Model Memorandum of Understanding  
In 2007, the Model MOU, which formed the basis of MOUs, concluded between TCCs and 
the UN, was amended to include explicit references to SEA; this was the first update since 
1997.214  
One of the major changes in the 2007 Model MOU was that its amendments boosted the 
criminal accountability of national contingents who committed acts of serious misconduct 
during their deployment on a peacekeeping mission.215 Articles 7 bis to 7 sexiens of the 
Model MOU demonstrate that the amended provisions on accountability, investigations, 
discipline and standards of conduct apply to all personnel contributed by a TCC,216 
addressing one of the areas that inhibited accountability. Additionally, Annex H of the 2007 
Model MOU – titled ‘We Are United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel’ – details applicable 
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standards of conduct applicable to all personnel, including specific references to refraining 
from transactional sex, sex with minors or any other acts of SEA.217 
The 2007 Model MOU also introduced a new investigative process that differed from pre-
existing processes by placing the obligation of conducting investigations into serious 
misconduct (which includes sexual exploitation) on the TCC as opposed to the OIOS and 
other UN structures. However, in this configuration, the UN is still able to conduct a 
preliminary fact-finding inquiry in order to preserve evidence in the event that national 
governments do not act timeously.218 
Without going into all of the technical details of the 2007 Model MOU – a 63-page chapter 
forming part of the broader policy and procedure manual – the Model MOU undoubtedly 
increased the responsibility of TCCs in ensuring their personnel were familiar with UN 
standards of conduct and in investigating and taking action against allegations of sexual 
misconduct. For instance, it creates an obligation for TCCs to inform the UN of evidence of 
serious misconduct and to forward it to its national authorities for domestic proceedings.219 
While the increased obligations on states to take action are commendable, they are 
constrained by the limited ability of the UN itself to enforce compliance from states. The UN 
additionally assumes a more subsidiary role in investigations, unlike prior to 2007 when the 
UN conducted investigations against national contingents,220 which renders information 
sharing at the discretion of authorities if they are not restricted by domestic regulations.221 
The UN is also required to share evidence it has collected with national authorities. While 
this may result in improved chances of prosecution where allegations have been 
substantiated, it can also allow states to hinder accountability measures by obstructing 
investigations through recalling suspected perpetrators and preventing cases from proceeding 
to the Board of Inquiry.222 
The way that the UN implements its policies must also be considered against the backdrop 
that it may prove impractical or unrealistic to expect peacekeeping personnel to remain 
abstinent and comply with the prohibition of soliciting prostitutes, especially when condoms 
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are provided as part of HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention campaigns.223 However, the 
necessary provision of condoms to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS may appear implicitly to 
condone sexual interactions. While the Model MOU refers to “special constraints in 
[peacekeepers’] public and private lives” in the course of their work as peacekeepers,224 the 
prohibition of prostitution raises the question of whether enforced chastity can be considered 
such a special constraint. 
3.3.4. UN Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Resolution S/RES/2272, 
Preventative and Remedial Action  
In 2016, the UNSC passed resolution S/RES/2272 in response to the public attention that was 
drawn to the SEA allegations and evidence of impunity at the UN’s mission in the CAR – 
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African 
Republic (MINUSCA).225 While the resolution reaffirms many of the existing provisions of 
the zero tolerance policy, it also requests that the entire military or police contingent be 
dismissed when members therein have been subject to allegations of sexual misconduct and 
the state from which they hail has failed to follow due process regarding the investigation and 
reporting of the allegations.226 This resolution demonstrates a welcome shift in the way that 
the UN has enforced its zero tolerance policy, although the contingent repatriation 
mechanism does not appear to include civilian personnel and therefore leaves room for 
continued abuses by civilian personnel.227 
The UN has three keys methods of remedial action for victims that form the United Nations 
Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse by United Nations Staff and Related Personnel. These methods were adopted by the 
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UNGA in 2007: the Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
(Trust Fund); paternity claims and victim assistance.228 
In 2016, the Trust Fund was established by the UNSG and supports specialised projects that 
provide services for victims and strengthens communal SEA complaint networks in the DRC. 
The Trust Fund has USD 2 million from voluntary contributions from 19 states – of which 
South Africa is not one – and approximately USD 317,000 from the withheld pay of 
peacekeeping personnel whose SEA allegations were substantiated. These funds are used to 
support victims, victim support services and education and training of victims in the Central 
African Republic and Liberia.229 
Another measure that the UN has endorsed to address SEA is increasing the proportion of 
women in peacekeeping missions,230 especially when considering that sexual misconduct is 
primarily committed by male peacekeepers whose victims are primarily women as well as 
young girls and boys. The logic behind increasing female participation in peacekeeping goes 
beyond gender equity; the discipline of male peacekeepers is believed by some scholars to 
improve when they work with women. Increased visibility of women in peacekeeping also 
creates role models for local women in communities served by peacekeeping missions.231 In 
addition, even if the increased female presence does not directly contribute to decreased 
incidents of SEA, it results in increased reporting from victims. The increased presence of 
women may also serve to temper hyper-masculine military that allow such actions to occur, 
often excused with the notion that ‘boys will be boys’.232 However, in this line of argument 
one must not ignore that women themselves can be perpetrators of similar crimes and often 
are unwilling to report misconduct of their male colleagues, despite their obligations to do 
so.233  
Given the institutional and legal constraints facing the UN in terms of the accountability 
mechanisms at its disposal – repatriation or banning from future missions – the UN could be 
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more effective at promoting preventative measures. The Zeid Report represented the first 
comprehensive attempt not only to prevent SEA but to address the underlying institutional 
cultures that unintentionally foster it. Preventative measures that the UN undertakes are 
comprised of pre and post-deployment training, public outreach to local communities within 
the host nation, vetting for records of prior misconduct while in the service of the UN as well 
as carrying out risk assessment and risk management activities in the area where the mission 
is to be conducted.234  
Despite this, in 2013, an internal UN report made recommendations that essentially mirrored 
those made by the Zeid Report, with a focus of strengthening the enforcement of policy.235 
This demonstrates that the UN’s comprehensive policy frameworks are still struggling to 
translate policy outcomes into changed behaviour over a decade later. However, the 
immunity afforded to peacekeeping personnel derived from the 1946 Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, which is rooted in Article 105(1) of the UN 
Charter and the SOFAs,236 remains perhaps the largest single obstacle to achieving 
accountability through policy enforcement. 
3.4. UN practices about Sexual Misconduct in MONUC and 
MONUSCO 
The formulation of new policies and guidelines in response to investigations, while 
commendable, does not always translate into changes in behaviour.237 Thus, the purpose of 
this section is to outline how the aforementioned provisions of Bulletin ST/SGB/2003/13 and 
the Zeid Report have been implemented by the relevant UN bodies, and not to perform an 
evaluation of these interventions per se, as it falls beyond the scope of this research. 
Prior to the zero-tolerance era, the UN, through the DPKO, had measures in place to combat 
SEA including pre-deployment training, codes of conduct for uniformed personnel, an 
initiative to address human trafficking and OIOS investigations.238 However, it became clear 
that the DPKO was limited in its capacity to address SEA effectively, especially when the 
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accused formed part of national contingents whose states retained the exclusive authority 
over their discipline.239 
The UN met the Zeid Report with action, especially regarding the introduction of 
preventative measures. TCCs were sent mandatory pre-deployment training modules on 
SEA-related conduct; missions were also requested to provide recreation and welfare 
facilities to all personnel.240 A team responsible for overseeing conduct and discipline was 
established within the DPKO, and teams were deployed to the various Missions, where 
processes for reporting, investigation and monitoring of allegations were put in place.241 
After 2005, the OIOS was also permitted to investigate allegations of serious misconduct 
relating to national contingents, which was not previously the case; these OIOS investigations 
could also result in repatriation.242  
One of the most vital UN-led processes in combatting SEA is the allegation investigation 
procedure. This procedure is comprised of a preliminary investigation to establish facts; if the 
evidence identified suggests that serious misconduct has occurred, the investigation is 
reviewed by the Board of Inquiry and the appropriate action is recommended.243 Focal points 
– who are responsible for receiving reports, identifying patterns and monitoring incidents – 
also participate in investigative processes and submit their recommendations in a report to the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, after which a decision is taken on whether 
the alleged perpetrator will be repatriated to their country of origin.244 Despite this, according 
to scholars like Deen-Racsmány and Sarah Smith, there is little evidence that repatriation 
serves as a sufficient deterrent of misconduct, with on-site prosecutions like courts-martial 
serving as a more effective deterrent.245 
While the improved investigative processes make for better reporting, these investigative 
processes are not without fault. For instance, many Missions lack the capacity for personnel 
monitoring and possess weak capacity, which hinders effective coordination between 
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different categories of personnel as well as for incomplete reporting.246 Additionally, 
investigations have been criticised for their lack of adequate witness protection procedures.247 
Several of the issues related specifically to investigative procedures could be addressed with 
the appointment of a specialised UN investigators, which would ensure that investigative 
capacity can be met, and the appointment of people with sufficient knowledge of domestic 
TCC laws, so that if cases are referred to national authorities for prosecution, they already 
meet the relevant standards.248 In this regard, courts-martial during the Mission are an 
effective method of ensuring that there is access to evidence and witnesses. Courts-martial 
additionally demonstrate a commitment to accountability for both the victims and the wider 
community who may not have been victims of SEA.249 
Following the presentation of the Zeid Report, which also called for mission-specific 
interventions beyond the more general recommendations, certain interventions were 
undertaken by MONUC specifically, to force compliance with the zero-tolerance policy. 
Some of the measures included prohibiting peacekeepers from going to local establishments 
known to be popular for prostitution, imposing curfews, and requiring personnel to always 
wear their uniforms to facilitate their identification and monitoring their movements.250 
However, the occurrence of SEA is not unique to the DRC, although it may vary in scale 
across peacekeeping operations, but generally occurs in situations where there are generally 
problems with compliance with codes of conduct and the presence of ill-discipline.251 The 
DPKO concluded that bringing an end to SEA would require changes to rules and procedures 
as well as changes in the attitudes and culture of peacekeeping missions.252  
After 2005, the DPKO created the Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) under the Office of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.253 The CDU is responsible for 
overseeing the training of peacekeepers, monitoring activities, making preliminary 
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assessments of allegations and providing policy guidance. The training provided also has 
mission specific elements; for example, in MONUC, additional regulations on peacekeepers 
deemed appropriate by the CDU included off-limits areas, curfews, welfare activities and the 
prohibition of non-UN personnel travelling in UN vehicles.254 The CDU maintained offices 
in Kinshasa, at the headquarters of MONUC and established the Field Conduct and 
Discipline Team (FCDT) in Goma, Bunia and Bukavu, expanding to other locations over the 
years; field visits were also conducted by CDU personnel. These have continued to operate 
into MONUSCO.255  
Additionally, in 2008, a Conduct and Discipline Advisory Committee (CDAC) was 
established, comprised of senior personnel, to “reinforce standards and the commitment to 
compliance with the zero-tolerance policy.”256 
The extensive CDU set-up from MONUC was continued in MONUSCO. Moreover, 
MONUSCO’s Conduct and Discipline Team (CDT) advises the Mission Head on all matters 
relating to conduct and discipline in the mission has other functions. These functions include: 
providing guidance on the establishment SEA preventative measures (including capacity-
building support on SEA awareness and community outreach); receiving, tracking and 
reporting on all allegations; liaising with all actors involved in misconduct allegations; as 
well as liaising with all peacekeeping mission stakeholders regarding misconduct policies and 
management.257 
3.5. UN SEA Practices and Norm Internalisation Mechanisms 
The UN has an extensive set of SEA-related practices at the institutional and field levels. Of 
notable concern is the Zeid Report’s revelation that peacekeepers did not understand that the 
women in their operation areas were traumatised and vulnerable. This demonstrates a lack of 
understanding of the appropriate behaviour towards woman and the norms that underpin what 
is appropriate. This presents a challenge regarding internalisation, especially because the UN 
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is a key actor in the internalisation process. Although it may appear that the frameworks are 
tools of coercion to force compliance or adoption of the norms therein, the UN’s lack of real 
authority in enforcing conduct and authority is a result of its inability to attach incentives or 
conditions to appropriate behaviour standards. This is further hampered by the fact that it is 
the UN that is dependent on the contributions of member states, which is not the usual 
dynamic at play in IGO conditionality-based coercion. 
The zero-tolerance policy framework is clearly rooted in a normative understanding that to 
sexually abuse or exploit women – especially during peacekeeping – is not appropriate. There 
is no question that the UN supports these norms. The UN has institutionalised these norms 
through the various resolutions and agencies dedicated to eradicating gender-based violence. 
Notions of appropriateness, having been set by the UN, must be internalised by states through 
various methods of socialisation: strategic calculations, role playing, or normative suasion. 
However, internalisation can only be achieved by through truly interacting with these policies 
and the norms that underpin them.    
The logic of appropriateness, a key element of the process of norm internalisation through 
emulation, is exceptionally relevant here. The UN’s SEA frameworks cannot be interpreted 
as being tools of competition or learning, as those are primarily state-driven processes. 
Additionally, as already stated, the UN lacks the coercive leverage for force compliance in 
this way. The problem lies here: while the UN embraces norms concerning the appropriate 
behaviour towards women, its inability to use its position as an IGO to achieve normative 
suasion has left it in a precarious political dynamic. Its dependence on member states for 
implementation of its policies limits its ability to punish those who violate the norms by 
displaying inappropriate behaviour.  
3.6. Conclusion 
Following revelations of widespread peacekeeper sexual misconduct in the early 2000s, the 
UN committed to reforming its peace mission policy framework by introducing a zero-
tolerance policy. While the individual documents that make up the policy are extensive, the 
UN has limited influence when it comes to actually ensuring that policies are adhered to and 
punishing those who do not. 
The introduction of Bulletin ST/SGB/2003/13 in 2003, the Zeid Report in 2005, the amended 
Model MOU in 2007 and the several resolutions and strategies in between outline a strategy 
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based on a normative understanding of what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate 
behaviour towards women by UN personnel. Mission specific interventions introduced in 
MONUC and MONUSCO additionally demonstrate commitment to zero-tolerance for those 
not complying with the underlying norms. This framework can be understood as a weak 
mechanism of coercion as the UN lacks the relevant authority over states, on which it relies 
for contributions of personnel and resources. 
The framework can therefore best be understood as a mechanism of emulation. As an 
organisational platform that plays a crucial role in the diffusion of norms, the UN’s 
framework sets the standards of appropriateness. In the absence of coercive measures, states 
must then adopt these standards, with norm internalisation taking place when states engage 
and interact with the norms. Learning and competition are state-driven processes and 
therefore have little relevance As such, this relationship between states and its interaction 
with the UN, bearing in mind the delicate collaborative arrangements that underscore peace 
missions, is where the foundation of internalisation is laid. 
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4. South African personnel in MONUC and MONUSCO 
4.1. Introduction 
South Africa has remained one of the largest African contributors and participants in 
peacekeeping missions across the African continent hosted by the UN, African Union (AU) 
and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) since 1999. The country has 
provided assistance in Lesotho, Burundi, Sudan, South Sudan and the Central African 
Republic. These deployments are necessary for the South African government’s pursuit of 
foreign policy objectives regarding its role as a peace-broker.258 However, large volumes of 
predominantly male peacekeepers deployed to fragile post-conflict environments often result 
in the stimulation of the local sex industry,259 in which South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) personnel have been reported to partake. 
South Africa was one of the first countries to deploy personnel to the DRC, with the first 
deployment in 1999. This deployment was locally called ‘Operation Mistral’, following the 
conclusion of the Lusaka Agreement. South Africa deployed more forces after the 
assassination of then-president Laurent-Désiré Kabila and the conclusion of the Sun City 
agreement in 2001 and 2002, respectively.260  
South Africa has also contributed personnel to the United Nations Operation in Burundi 
(ONUB), which took over from the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2004.261 
South Africa had previously played a vital role as a mediator in Burundi prior to and during 
AMIB, however, the formation of ONUB – with the rapid increase of deployed personnel – 
had the unintended consequence of creating an increased supply and demand for sex 
workers,262 despite peacekeepers’ prohibition from patronising sex workers. South African 
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peacekeepers were alleged to have been involved in several incidents of sexual misconduct 
and other offences related to poor discipline.263 
The UN’s mission in the DRC has been characterised by reports of high levels of SEA 
committed by peacekeeping personnel, especially following 2004 when this was widely 
reported in international media outlets. Allegations of children used in prostitution rings and 
being raped by peacekeepers initiated investigations that brought about much needed UN-
level interventions and reform. However, while it remains unclear if, or the extent to which, 
African personnel were involved in these activities, members of South African contingents 
have more generally been found to have engaged in activities which violate the UN’s zero-
tolerance policy. 
This chapter focuses on South African personnel deployed in MONUC and MONUSCO and 
policies enacted by the South African government to address sexual misconduct among its 
personnel. While in some instances, specific reference will be made to the total number of 
allegations, it is important to consider the limitations of the data on reported allegations in 
this regard.  
4.2. South African personnel in MONUC  
In 2001, South Africa made its first contribution to MONUC, following an urgent request by 
the UN for medical evacuation and small advance teams; 48 military police personnel were 
also deployed.264 In 2003, South Africa was called upon to make its first significant 
contribution of 1,000 soldiers, and subsequently, an additional 1,500 personnel comprised of 
infantry battalions and aviation regiments.265 
Although South Africa has been an early personnel contributor to MONUC, there is limited 
information available directly concerning allegations of SEA against South African 
peacekeepers prior to the mid-2000s. When the first media reports broke detailing the 
expansive allegations of SEA by peacekeepers in the DRC, very few national contingents 
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were identified. An investigative journalistic piece by Holt and Hughes referred to 
peacekeepers from Uruguay and Morocco soliciting sex from children in Bunia. The UN did 
not release the nationalities of alleged perpetrators in official documents to avoid 
embarrassing the states on which it was reliant for contributions. A Human Rights Watch 
investigation (HRW) identified that one French and six Moroccan peacekeepers were 
repatriated following SEA-related investigations; however, the nationalities of other 
personnel who had been sexually exploiting the children who had been interviewed were 
either not known or not published.266 Media reporting from global news publications 
implicated Tunisian, Pakistani, Nepalese and South African peacekeepers as being in the first 
major allegations of SEA, but provided little additional information.267 
Thus, although the UN did not release information on concerning the allegations against 
South African personnel, the existing media reporting is evidence enough that South African 
personnel were involved in sexual misconduct at a time when the zero-tolerance policy was 
in its formative stages. However, the information that is provided by the UN is not without its 
shortcomings. UN records available online regarding SEA in MONUC only date back to 
2007, and between 2007 and 2010 when MONUC became MONUSCO. In fact, UN data that 
includes national affiliations of perpetrators is relatively recent.  
Although this study’s focus is sexual misconduct, South African personnel have been 
reported generally to possess poor discipline. In instances where misconduct was not related 
to offences of a sexual nature, this information is still relevant. Poor conduct and discipline 
demonstrate an inability to adhere to the standards of behaviour that the UN has deemed 
appropriate during peace missions. 
Between 2002 and 2008, SANDF operational law directorate statistics revealed that South 
African personnel in the DRC and Burundi were found guilty of over 1,000 cases of 
misconduct for acts relating to drunkenness, absence without leave and disobeying 
commands.268 In the DRC, South African personnel had been involved in 264 cases and 546 
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military trials.269 Serious criminal cases were also opened involving incidents of assault, 
mistreatment of subordinates, intimidation, theft, refusal to obey commands, murder and 
rape, several of which involved high-ranking officers.270 A UN chief internal investigator 
stated in 2005 that South African personnel were included in an OIOS investigation, and that 
the SANDF court-martialled a South African colonel for an alleged sexual assault on a 
Congolese interpreter of unknown gender.271 
In a 2008 article in an internal SANDF magazine, a piece written by a colonel noted general 
attitudes of ill-discipline among SANDF personnel, citing officers concerned primarily with 
self-enrichment and uniformed members disappearing during working hours as examples.272 
This general trend of poor discipline among SANDF troops came to the forefront following 
illegal protest action by approximately 2,000 soldiers, 1,300 of whom were subsequently 
dismissed; the then-Minister of Defence was forced to acknowledge that there was a “serious 
problem of discipline in the defence force”.273  
The general history of misconduct by South African personnel demonstrates that during 
MONUC, there was a pattern of general misconduct by South African military contingents. 
Given the significant volume of misconduct cases – although it is unknown exactly how 
many of these took place in the DRC specifically – it would not be surprising to see that there 
were more cases of SEA involving members of the SANDF. Empirical evidence suggests that 
there is a trend between general misconduct, poor discipline and SEA, where more of one 
begets more of the other.274 High levels of general misconduct can be representative of a 
breakdown of disciplinary structures; a breakdown of such structures may result in SEA 
being tolerated among contingents.  
Although South African military personnel are often cited as having superior training and 
equipment than their African counterparts, during the course of MONUC this was proven not 
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to be the case.275 Therefore, despite the relative similarity among African TCCs, South Africa 
still stands out as having a higher proportion of allegations against its personnel for SEA, 
although it is possible that other TCCs are committing offenses at similar rates and they 
simply have not been reported as much. South Africa also contributes more personnel than 
many of the other TCCs, therefore more personnel also create more opportunities for 
misconduct.  
4.3. South African personnel in MONUSCO  
Since MONUSCO was established, South Africa has continued to play a leading role in its 
contributions, providing between 1,200 and 1,500 personnel between 2010 and 2012.276 
While this has decreased to approximately 1,158 in early 2018,277 South Africa also 
contributes to the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), a force authorised by UNSC resolution 
2098 in 2013. This resolution was created to neutralise offensive rebel groups including M23 
that had taken hold of parts of the Eastern DRC and posed a threat to civilians.278  
UN data and media reporting continues to single out South Africa for the sexual misconduct 
of its personnel during MONUSCO. Between 2015 and 2018, the data indicated that 28 of the 
total 76 allegations were attributed to South African personnel.279 While there may be several 
other explanations for this, the South African allegations are still higher than the 13 
allegations levied against Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Tanzania and Uruguay – who 
contribute almost 10,000 personnel in total – combined over the same period.280 This 
demonstrates that even with the UN’s comprehensive zero-tolerance policy in place by the 
time MONUSCO was operational, South African non-compliance remains a concern.  
During a brief to the National Assembly in 2013, the Minister of Defence reported that 93 
members of the SANDF deployed as peacekeeping personnel to MONUSCO had cases of 
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misconduct brought against them, at least 23 of which involved incidents of sexual abuse, 
sexual exploitation, unspecified assaults against women and rape.281 South Africa was again 
in the spotlight for sexual misconduct in a 2015 OIOS statement; nine allegations were 
levelled against its personnel deployed on UN peacekeeping missions in the DRC, Sudan and 
South Sudan.282 In the same year, South Africa reportedly recalled 50 of its personnel 
stationed in the DRC for alleged breaches of SANDF and UN codes of conduct regarding 
curfew violations,283 although it is unclear whether any of these were directly related to SEA 
allegations, SEA incidents often occur when curfews are violated.284 
In February 2018, four allegations of SEA were made against South African personnel for 
physical violence against a 17 year-old Congolese boy, and the sexual exploitation of at least 
three women, one of whom was seeking child support for a child allegedly fathered by a 
peacekeeper, in the Beni, Goma and Sake towns in North Kivu province.285 South African 
authorities deployed a team including legal practitioners and humanitarian law experts, at the 
request of the UN, to assist with the investigation into the allegations as well as related to 
matters of paternity,286 however, the outcome of these investigations, especially those related 
to paternity, were unclear. 
Media reporting by the national South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) in March 
2018 stated that the UN was “reviewing the deployment of [SANDF] troops to its 
peacekeeping missions over growing concerns of misconduct and indiscipline within its 
ranks,”287 based on the nine allegations that had been made against South African 
peacekeepers between January and March of 2018. The review was in line with the 
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provisions of UNSC resolution S/RES/2272, which permits the repatriation of entire units 
when there have been allegations of misconduct against some of its members.288 
To combat the sexual exploitation and abuse of women in the DRC by South African 
personnel requires collaborative efforts between both the UN and South African authorities. 
The UN’s zero-tolerance policy and its affiliated policies is the overarching framework 
within which all actors party to peace missions must comply. However, the UN’s lack of 
enforcement capacity due to the legal and political arrangements that underpin these 
missions, TCCs like South Africa must also provide their own policy guidelines and take 
action to ensure that the UN’s standards of appropriate behaviour towards women are upheld. 
4.4. South African Policies: Sexual Misconduct  
All South African personnel are required to behave in accordance with the established UN 
zero-tolerance policy as is outlined in Chapter 3. However, because of the political and legal 
arrangements between the UN and South Africa as a TCC, South Africa is responsible for the 
behaviour and discipline of its deployed personnel, even when they are under centralised UN 
control.  
South African peace mission personnel of all categories receive UN designed pre-deployment 
training, to make them aware of the content of the zero-tolerance policy. Training and the 
documents that personnel sign indicate that any kind of sexual interaction with beneficiaries 
of aid, or are children is prohibited. South African personnel additionally agree to operate 
under ‘special constraints’, including refraining from participating in sexual exploitation or 
abuse in line with the UN conduct policies to which they are bound. Moreover, South African 
personnel remain bound by South African policies, especially in relation to what is or is not 
appropriate or permissible behaviour. 
The 1999 South African Government White Paper on South African Participation in 
International Peace Missions (Peace Mission White Paper) provides the policy framework 
within which South Africa must operate when it contributes to IGO peace missions, like 
those of the UN. This document presents explicit provisions regarding discipline. It states 
clearly that military police personnel and force commanders included in deployments are 
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responsible for ensuring the “good order and discipline of their personnel.”289 Many of the 
personnel are drawn from the SANDF, and they must also behave in accordance with the 
SANDF Code of Conduct. In it, uniformed SANDF members pledge to, “treat all people 
fairly and respect their rights and dignity at all times, regardless of … gender…”, to “not 
abuse [their] authority [or] position…” and in situations of armed conflict, they pledge not to 
“tolerate or engage in rape…”290 
A UNGA report on the special measures to be taken for protection from SEA noted that 
South Africa intended to table a defence bill before Parliament to make SEA a specific 
offence,291 especially since the guidelines in the SANDF Code of Conduct and the Peace 
Mission White Paper make no specific references to SEA. In September 2018, Minister of 
Defence, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula stated at the UN headquarters that the country is “in the 
process of finalising the Military Disciplinary Supplement Bill (Military Disciplinary Bill), 
which will prohibit and criminalise SEA offences in the area of deployment”, echoing the 
sentiments in the aforementioned UNGA report.292  
The Military Disciplinary Supplement Bill, although not yet enacted, will replace the Military 
Discipline Supplementary Measures Act of 1999 (Military Disciplinary Act), which is 
currently in place.293 The Military Disciplinary Act jurisdiction makes explicit reference to 
rape as an offense that warrants military discipline, but does not include the more nuanced 
and robust interpretations of sexual abuse or exploitation as per the UN’s zero-tolerance 
policy.294 This may cause conflict when it comes to the application of military discipline; 
therefore the significance of the Military Disciplinary Bill’s enactment cannot be understated 
as the bill will align South Africa’s military discipline codes with those of the UN.295 While 
one can only speculate about the potential effects that the Military Disciplinary Bill may 
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have, given that it has not yet been enacted, it certainly demonstrates a political move 
towards making explicit provisions within South African policies to combat SEA. 
The DPKO requires all TCCs to provide it with legal frameworks that are applicable to their 
contingents during their deployment on UN peacekeeping missions.296 However, South 
Africa is one of the 76 TCCs that have not provided the DPKO with their legal framework on 
conduct.297 It is not clear why this has been the case; however, such a legal framework is 
more likely to be provided when domestic legal codes are in line with UN policies. The 
Military Disciplinary Bill’s enactment may thus be another step forward towards full 
compliance with UN and DPKO requirements. 
4.5. Conclusion 
As one of the largest TCCs in the largest single and longest running UN peace mission, South 
African personnel sexual misconduct against women has been quite well documented, even 
in instances where UN data is vague or not available. Even before the UN began publishing 
the nationalities of SEA perpetrators, media reporting and acknowledgments from the South 
African government itself confirmed that SEA by its personnel was occurring. However, in 
these revelations, South Africa has maintained its commitment to honouring the zero-
tolerance policy. 
South African personnel is bound by UN standards of conduct and the UN’s zero-tolerance 
policy is an explicit policy framework that has evolved since 2003 to prevent and address 
sexual misconduct by peace mission personnel of all categories by prescribing what 
constitutes appropriate behaviour. However, personnel deployed by South Africa 
simultaneously remain bound by domestic policies and codes of conduct – for example, 
SANDF personnel are still required to observe the SANDF Code of Conduct. Moreover, 
these domestic policies do not make explicit provisions for a nuanced understanding of 
sexual misconduct by peacekeepers and tend to classify it under broader themes to do with 
good discipline. 
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South Africa’s approach to UN peace missions focusses on remaining consistent with 
international standards and practices set by UN’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping 
Operations.298 While the reliance on international standards may be beneficial when it comes 
to ensuring that South African participants are consistent with international best practice, it 
can become difficult to ensure accountability when n domestic and international standards are 
not aligned.  
The absence of explicit South African SEA policy provisions that seek to add domestic 
relevance to the overarching zero-tolerance policy only serve to complicate the already 
delicate dynamics between South Africa and the UN when it comes to the division of labour 
in international peace missions. However, recent developments in the enactment of a Military 
Disciplinary Bill show that South Africa is moving closer towards aligning its domestic 
policies with those of the UN. While it is far too early to tell what effect these changes will 
have on the behaviour of personnel, they demonstrate at least a political commitment to 
embodying the values of the UN. 
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5. South African Sexual Misconduct in MONUC and MONUSCO 
5.1. Introduction 
Chapter 4 explored how numerous allegations of sexual misconduct have been levelled 
against South African personnel in the DRC. The absence of an explicit prohibition of SEA in 
the South African policies with which personnel must comply, is likely to have exacerbated 
this situation. The Military Disciplinary Bill, which represents an attempt to align local 
policies with international standards regarding SEA, has not yet come into effect. Yet, this 
and other developments demonstrate that South Africa has a desire to combat SEA 
committed by its personnel. 
This chapter explores the methods and practices implemented by South Africa, which are 
largely in accordance with the UN’s zero-tolerance policy. When states declare a belief in a 
norm, it is reasonable to expect their actions and behaviour to reflect this. South Africa has 
demonstrated both a political and practical commitment to norms concerning appropriate 
behaviour towards women in peace missions. However, its personnel continue to be singled 
out for their perpetration of SEA.  
5.2. South African Practices relating to South African Sexual 
Misconduct in MONUC and MONUSCO 
South Africa’s commitment to the UN’s zero-tolerance policy at a political level is clear. In 
September 2018, Minister Mapisa-Nqakula made the following statement at a meeting about 
peacekeeping at the UN’s headquarters: 
“South Africa is fully committed to rooting out sexual abuse by 
peacekeepers and take such allegations in a serious light. Furthermore, 
South Africa is committed to the promotion and protection of human rights, 
with particular focus on the rights and welfare and protection of women in 
conflict countries.”299 
The above statement not only illustrates support for combatting SEA but it also demonstrates 
a political commitment to the protection of women from sexual abuse. Considered against 
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this backdrop, South Africa’s participation in UN initiatives dedicated to the eradication of 
SEA is consistent with this position. For example, South Africa is member of the UNSG’s 
Circle of Leadership (CoL). While the CoL is primarily a means by which states can declare 
their commitment to ending SEA, it provides the opportunity for the exchange of ideas, 
progress, and practices in combatting SEA while supporting pre-existing strategies.300 
Another symbolic political action undertaken by South Africa was the signing of the 
Voluntary Compact on Elimination of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, which expresses a 
commitment to prevent and address SEA.301 
While South Africa has taken steps in aligning its domestic policies with the UN, and 
supports UN initiatives, the practices that it currently undertakes are just as important in 
understanding how it addresses sexual misconduct by its personnel. Although the Military 
Disciplinary Bill’s enactment is forthcoming, South Africa, through its actions, already 
participates in international strategies aimed at addressing SEA; such actions include 
“appropriate preventative actions, awareness campaigns and pre-deployment training.”302 
Examples of South African SEA-specific practices include a request for the UN to provide a 
two-day pre-deployment training workshop for 820 peacekeepers on SEA prevention in June 
2017.303 Other preventative actions include the establishment of a vetting committee in order 
to identify personnel with previous or current criminal legal proceedings or violations of 
international humanitarian or human rights law.304 The vetting committee also identifies 
previous disciplinary repatriations or orders prohibiting further peacekeeping participation in 
order to prevent these individuals from being re-deployed.305 There has also been an instance 
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of contingents being repatriated proactively for curfew violations, given that curfew 
violations often occur in conjunction with SEA.306 
South Africa also has a three-person national standby investigative team in the DRC, which 
can be deployed within 72 hours to investigate allegations of misconduct against its 
contingents.307 For example, in 2018 South Africa deployed a team including legal 
practitioners and humanitarian law experts, at the request of the UN, to assist with 
investigations into SEA allegations as well as related to matters related to paternity.308 The 
alleged perpetrators’ payment is suspended while allegations are being investigated. The 
payments are reimbursed if no supporting evidence is found;309 however, when this is not the 
case, it is likely that these payments are placed in the Trust Fund. 
In the same year, a joint Parliamentary briefing on international peacekeeping operations by 
the SANDF and Department of International Relations and Cooperation, reported that South 
African personnel stationed in the DRC under MONUSCO were trained in accordance with 
the UN’s zero-tolerance policy. They also signed legal documents pledging not to engage in 
SEA.310 In the briefing, it was also noted that all allegations against peacekeepers were 
investigated and uniformed personnel were court-martialled and replaced when found to have 
been guilty of serious misconduct (SEA is classified as serious misconduct in UN 
frameworks).311 The use of courts-martial to find personnel soldiers guilty of SEA 
accountable has been publicly documented, and the use of this procedure is in line with UN 
guidelines.312 However, the Military Disciplinary Act – which currently governs the use of 
South African military courts – does not yet include specific or clear provisions relating to 
sexual exploitation or acts that constitute sexual abuse under the zero-tolerance policy but are 
not necessarily rape. This policy mismatch may ultimately render accountability efforts less 
effective. 
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The male-heavy composition of peace missions is male-heavy and SEA is typically 
understood to be perpetrated by men. The inclusion of greater numbers of women has been 
thought to be a strategy to address SEA. South African efforts to increase the presence of 
women is in line with UN frameworks on gender mainstreaming – including UNSC 
resolution 1325(2000) –313 and the assumption is that the presence of more women would 
stem sexual misconduct.314 While official South African policies on the increased inclusion 
of women in the armed forces fall more neatly under military transformation policies, they 
are also touted as a means to address SEA by the predominantly male military.315  
These assumptions are driven by perceptions that women can influence the behaviour of their 
male counterparts, that they are more compassionate towards victims of sexual and gender-
based violence and that they serve as role models to local women and may encourage 
reporting of crimes.316 Other non-SEA-focused reasons provided for the increased presence 
of women include that they are better able to perform body searches on women, as well as 
work with women’s prisons and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) 
centres.317 
South Africa already has the highest proportion of female personnel deployed in the DRC, 
with 18 percent of South African personnel being women compared to the average of 3.8 
percent across other UN peacekeeping missions, yet South Africa also has the highest 
incidents of SEA for a single TCC in the DRC, relatively speaking.318 This demonstrates that 
while more women in peacekeeping is arguably a good thing for a variety of reasons, the 
SEA-related assumptions that may lead to their inclusion are not always a reflection of reality 
or as effective as expected. 
In 2014, Alchin, Gouws and Heinecken conducted focus group discussions with women who 
had been deployed as peacekeepers. The findings of this research revealed that female 
counterparts of the male peacekeepers who had sexual relationships with local women, 
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tended to more generally accept these practices.319 So accepted were these relationships that 
one peacekeeper commented: “today he has this girlfriend and tomorrow he has that one”,320 
indicating the casual manner in which these relationships were conducted. Alchin, Gouws 
and Heinecken additionally commented that it was clear that power dynamics in these 
relationships were not understood by the peacekeepers.321 These relationships are clear 
violations of the UN’s zero-tolerance policy. Not only is this conduct prohibited, the women 
witnessing this are also bound by UN rules to report these relationships; their ability to speak 
casually about the prohibited relationships of their male counterparts demonstrates that even 
women do not always adopt and internalise the norms around the appropriate treatment of 
women.  
The assumption that the presence of women can improve the behaviour of their male 
counterparts also shifts the responsibility for the conduct of men onto women,322 despite the 
fact that women in militarised settings have also been accused of participating in SEA 
including gang rape, and violating standards of appropriate behaviour towards women.323 
Thus, the presence of women alone is not enough to overhaul such a culture and women must 
not be held responsible for policing the behaviour of men, nor should their presence be seen 
as a solution to the misconduct of male personnel.324 
Despite the efforts that South Africa has implemented to demonstrate compliance with the 
zero-tolerance policy, it is difficult to determine whether these interventions have made a 
significant difference. In fact, while there has been a general decrease in SEA allegations 
across the board, UN data suggests that allegations against SANDF personnel are on the rise. 
Ten allegations were reported against South African personnel in 2018, the most since 2015 
when nationality data began being recorded (however only three of these incidents were 
reported to have actually taken place in 2018, with the rest occurring in previous years.)325 Of 
these ten allegations, eight were for sexual exploitation, one for sexual abuse and one for 
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both.326 Given that the majority of allegations against South Africans are for sexual 
exploitation, the absence of specific policies and practices addressing sexual exploitation is a 
serious concern. Perhaps the closest thing to sexual exploitation-specific strategy was a 
suggestion by a Parliamentary committee member that personnel be deployed for 
significantly shorter periods so that they can spend less time away from their partners, which 
should in theory decrease the incentive to engage in prohibited sexually exploitative 
practices.327 Without commenting on the merit of this suggestion, there is certainly more 
scope for interventions to address sexual exploitation on its own, given that this is where the 
majority of South African offenses lie. 
Military peacekeepers are drawn from the armed forces of a country and these individuals 
represent a broad spectrum of society from certain environments. Empirical research 
conducted by Karim and Beardsley indicated that higher levels of gender equity within the 
society of a TCC (including high ratios of women in the workforce or girls attending school) 
can result in lower levels of SEA allegations against its military.328 South Africa is one of the 
six TCCs with a significant number of allegations of SEA against its contingents. The other 
five countries with a significant number of SEA allegations are Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Tunisia and Uruguay.  
Aside from having higher levels of SEA allegations against their personnel, all six countries 
also scored poorly on the UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index.329 Despite South Africa’s strong 
legal and institutional support for gender equality, in practice, women are regularly the 
targets of gender-based violence.330 High levels of gender-based violence directed at women 
demonstrates that positive attitudes towards gender equality are not widely embodied in 
mainstream South African society, and poor levels of gender equity are correlated with higher 
incidents of SEA.  Additionally, sentiments held by men within the SANDF regarding and 
towards women generally express that women are not welcome. These attitudes may be a 
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product of communal and familial cultures that do not value women as equals outside of the 
military, with these dynamics reproduced within military structures.331 
Women’s empowerment is a slow and multi-stakeholder process and the South African 
government has taken steps to improve it. South Africa has, through its collaborations with 
the UN Development Programme, attempted to achieve gender equity and women’s 
empowerment.332 Gender mainstreaming and transformation programmes for the military 
have also been implemented although the effects on SEA are questionable. While these may 
not be intended explicitly to address peacekeeper sexual misconduct, there is evidence that 
suggests their contributions towards gender equity may impact SEA. 
Sexual misconduct by South African personnel can also be considered within the wider scope 
of the general ill-discipline of SANDF personnel. The roots of the SANDF’s poor 
disciplinary record range from budgetary constraints that result in poor training and human 
resources limitations, to the process of forming the SANDF by combining the 
professionalised South African Defence Force and anti-apartheid guerrilla units. These 
factors have arguably contributed to the lack of a shared military culture and low morale 
which some argue is responsible for the poor conduct of SANDF personnel.333 However, 
while the government has acknowledged the “serious problem of discipline in the defence 
force”,334 its SEA-practices do not appear to treat poor conduct and sexual misconduct as 
symptoms of the same disease. Considerably more public attention has been given to 
addressing sexual misconduct, as these allegations are inconsistent with South Africa’s 
presented international self-image.  
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5.3. South African Personnel Sexual Misconduct and Norm 
Internalisation Mechanisms 
Norm Internalisation is the culmination of several political processes and dynamics. The UN 
as an organisational platform serves as a key actor when it comes to diffusing norms and 
ensuring that they move from the stages of Norm Emergence to Norm Cascade. Thereafter, 
its role becomes more dynamic depending on the situation. 
Concerning peace missions, it is unquestionable that the UN plays a constitutive role in 
determining what is and is not appropriate. The UN thus plays a key role in determining 
which norms apply in peace missions. States that choose to participate in these missions must 
then conduct themselves in a manner that is considered appropriate by the UN; this process is 
facilitated by legal agreements and the provision of UN conduct standards, of which the zero-
tolerance policy is a part. Earlier sections of this study have concluded that normative 
considerations are one of the five justifications provided in the literature for peace mission 
participation.335 However, this does not respond to the key question that this section will 
address: why and how do states come to embrace the norms that underpin what is considered 
appropriate behaviour during these peace missions?  
Gilardi’s four mechanisms provide the framework through which Norm Internalisation 
occurs. The Gilardi analytical framework was utilised to examine the dynamics between 
South Africa as a TCC and the UN when it comes to addressing sexual misconduct in peace 
missions. Each of the lenses or mechanisms of this framework was applied in the 
examination of the relationship between South Africa as a TCC and the UN in this particular 
context. This process was used to develop a better understanding of the socialisation and 
internalisation processes and how these do – or do not – translate into behaving appropriately. 
5.3.1. Coercion 
The first factor that influences how norms are diffused and internalised is coercion. Although 
peace mission participation is voluntary, and South Africa was initially reluctant to 
participate during the early post-apartheid years. South Africa has now become one of the 
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major players on the continent when it comes to peace missions.336 However, when states 
commit to participate and sign an MOU with the UN, they agree to defer to the UN’s 
authority on a number of issues, the most relevant of which for this study is the conduct of 
their personnel. One of the primary methods of coercion is through conditionality. This 
method is not as easy to implement because the UN is dependent on the contributions of 
member states’ personnel and equipment to realise its missions. 
The UN has a few methods of coercion that it utilises to encourage compliance with its zero-
tolerance policy. This includes withholding the pay of personnel against whom there are SEA 
allegations and contributing this money to the Trust Fund where applicable. In the event that 
allegations of sexual misconduct against personnel have been met with state inaction, UNSC 
S/RES/2272 allows entire contingents to be dismissed. UNSG António Guterres’ reluctance 
to comment on whether he would expel South African personnel in light of UNSC 
S/RES/2272 is indicative of the political considerations that make coercion a difficult avenue 
for the UN to pursue.337  
In 2015, the UN began to publish the nationalities of those against whom there were SEA 
allegations. This practice raised the prospect of being shamed or embarrassed within the 
international community and consequently also served as a tool of coercion. This tool could 
be particularly useful where states involved are concerned with their self-image. However, 
South African SEA interventions predate the UN’s decision to publicly disclose the 
nationalities of alleged perpetrators. It is therefore unlikely that South Africa’s actions were 
influenced by the UN’s decision to publish this information. The UN’s coercive power is 
weakened since the TCCs are responsible for training and disciplining their personnel 
according to UN standards and national legal frameworks, leaving the UN with very little 
authority. 
There are few coercive measures that can be enforced when one party is dependent on the 
other. Despite the weak coercive powers of the UN, South Africa has complied substantially 
with UN best practice regarding SEA. For instance, payment is withheld from personnel 
under investigation and where applicable, they are repatriated. Coercion does not provide 
adequate explanations regarding the internalisation, or lack thereof, of these norms. If 
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anything, South Africa demonstrated a desire to address SEA before UNSC S/RES/2272 – 
arguably the most coercive tool at the UN’s disposal – was passed in 2016. 
5.3.2. Competition 
Competition is not a significant factor in the diffusion of norms from the UN to South Africa. 
The context in which Gilardi proposes competition is primarily economic – but this does not 
mean that competition has no place as an internalisation mechanism among states. The 
adoption of certain norms can yield non-tangible benefits within the international arena such 
as acceptance and prestige. It remains difficult to make a case for competition as a means of 
norm internalisation in the case of peace missions when considering South Africa, especially 
because competition is understood to be a state-driven mechanism. While competition may 
play a role in getting some states to adopt certain norms if there are elements of economic 
interdependence that can facilitate the proliferation of a norm, it does not play a significant 
role in the norm internalisation process between South Africa and the UN. 
5.3.3. Learning 
When it comes to learning as a means of norm internalisation, collective actions that declare 
support for a norm by the UN’s members, like resolutions, are more likely to encourage other 
states to adopt a norm. This is especially likely if there are real – or perceived – benefits for 
adopting the norm.338 It is difficult to argue that there are many explicit benefits for states 
that choose to adopt norms around the appropriate behaviour towards women in peace 
missions or prohibitions on sexual misconduct. However, when norms are in the process of 
being internalised, states that adopt those norms earlier are praised for their efforts or face 
stigma and disapproval from members of the international community if their behaviour runs 
counter to the norm.339  
Learning is understood to be a rational process and therefore, for South Africa, it would make 
sense to comply with the norms and their accompanying institutional frameworks in order to 
avoid international disapproval and shame and reap any benefits of praise associated with 
good conduct. Such benefits could include increased deployment, which is a benefit that 
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states like Burundi or Uganda are able to gain materially from through the reimbursement 
arrangements that generate revenue. However, for South Africa, UN peacekeeping is not a 
revenue generating exercise. UN reimbursements as agreed to in the MOU are deposited into 
the national fiscus and not back to the Department of Defence. The National Treasury then 
redistributes these funds; consequently, the SANDF barely recover all their costs, let alone 
generate income.340 
From 2005 to 2018, nine resolutions have been passed in the UNGA and UNSC regarding the 
UN’s approach to SEA.341 Voting on UN resolutions is a political process that involves 
negotiations and canvassing to ensure that a draft resolution has enough support to pass. 
Although South Africa was not required to vote for any of the UNGA resolutions as these 
were adopted without a vote, and South Africa was not a UNSC member when S/RES/2272 
was passed, the general support for these resolutions demonstrates that enough states in the 
international system support combatting SEA. These votes illustrate how learning can take 
place within an IGO, even though it is a state-driven process. The states adopt norms to fit 
into the international system and to avoid stigma and condemnation from other states. This 
relates to Acharya’s notion that adoption and acceptance of global norms (for example, those 
related to human rights) can be related to identity-construction and legitimation.342 The 
adoption of such strategies by states after they have been observed as utilised by other states, 
is a demonstration of learning. 
Peace mission participation is a means through which South Africa can achieve its foreign 
policy objectives,343 as well as secure its place within the community of states from which it 
was once excluded during its apartheid years. Domestic actors within South Africa use 
learning to ensure that both of these aims are achieved. South Africa benefits from the praise 
it receives from its peers and the UN, for declaring support for norms against sexually 
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exploitative and abusive behaviour by its personnel against women. The UN is also 
dependent on South Africa’s participation to achieve its goals.  
However, widely reported allegations of sexual misconduct against South African personnel 
undermines the praise received for its peacekeeping efforts and opens it up to punishments 
like those suggested in UNSC S/RES/2272. In 2014, the UN Under-Secretary-General for 
peacekeeping said of South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi that they, “stepped forward with 
dedicated, well trained and well equipped units.”344 In 2017, South Africa’s SEA 
interventions were included in an annexure on member state best practice by the UNGA 
along with Bangladesh, Egypt, Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Morocco, Togo, Tanzania, 
Uruguay, Algeria, Argentina, Benin, Canada, Ecuador, Guatemala, India, Malawi, Senegal, 
Sri Lanka and Vanuatu.345 While South Africa may have a genuine desire to combat SEA, its 
inclusion in best practice-related commendations also provides other states an opportunity to 
learn from its example; this, in turn can elicit more international praise and legitimacy as a 
human rights-forward country. Nevertheless, praise for compliance with a norm is evidence 
that full internalisation has not been achieved because “highly internalised norms [are] so 
taken for granted that [they] provoke no reaction whatsoever.”346  
5.3.4. Emulation 
The sections on coercion, competition and learning demonstrate the limited ways in which 
they can achieve norm internalisation. These processes are driven by inter-state interactions 
and, according to Gilardi, are most effective when used in economic matters. There is a lack 
of economic incentives associated with compliance with SEA-related norms for countries like 
South Africa. This means that other methods of internalisation must be explored. Countries 
like South Africa are significant contributors of personnel and equipment. This makes it very 
difficult, at times impossible, for the UN to levy harsh punishments against South Africa and 
similar countries, given the unique and collaborative nature of the process of peace missions. 
The reluctance of Guterres to comment on potential repatriation of South African contingents 
in line with UNSC S/RES/2272, which permits entire contingents to be recalled when there 
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are SEA allegations against any of its personnel, further compromises the capacity of the UN 
to act against perpetrators of SEA-related offences.347 
While coercion, competition and learning all provide potential explanations for how South 
Africa could have adopted a certain norm, they do not provide explanations for how norm 
acceptance translates into the appropriate behaviour that demonstrates internalisation of the 
norm. This is where emulation as the final mechanism of norm internalisation becomes most 
relevant. Emulation is driven by what is considered appropriate, as opposed to the threats and 
incentives that drive coercion, competition and learning as methods of norm internalisation. 
During peace missions, the UN determines what is considered appropriate. In this case, the 
UN has determined that sexually exploitative and abusive behaviour by personnel on its 
missions is not appropriate. South Africa agreed to behave in a manner consistent with what 
is deemed appropriate when it signed the MOU. However, agreeing to uphold the zero-
tolerance policy does not immediately translate into the appropriate behaviour; behaving 
accordingly because it is appropriate and not because of the consequences are achieved 
through socialisation.348 
Strategic calculations are influenced by consequences of compliance with a norm. This 
involves calculations where the anticipated rewards outweigh the costs of complying with a 
given norm.349 Allegations of sexual misconduct by South Africa’s personnel tarnish its 
international image. As such, strategic calculations that include maintaining a certain self-
image, as well as achieving domestic and foreign policy objectives are considerations that 
have been made. The Peace Mission White Paper outlines strategic considerations related to 
South African national interest as supporting criteria for international peace mission 
deployment, nevertheless, considerations are also given to those with whom there is a shared 
history of struggles against oppression.350 The extent, costs and duration of South Africa’s 
participation in UN, AU and SADC peace missions, as well as the significant investments in 
complying with the UN’s zero-tolerance framework suggest that South Africa is driven by 
more than a simple cost-benefit analysis.  
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An instrumental understanding of compliance informs role-playing, where a state follows a 
norm when it is in its interest to do so.351 Concerning peace missions, the appropriate 
behaviour and role that TCCs like South Africa should play is clearly defined and agreed to 
by both parties. The delineation of roles in the MOU – a legal agreement – fixes the role of 
both parties in a peace mission and therefore reduces the need for South Africa to determine 
its place in the peace mission dynamic, as its role is clearly spelled out in legal agreements. 
South Africa’s early deployments following its initial reluctance can be interpreted as an act 
of role-playing by assuming a position within the international system that it had already 
ascribed to. 
What determines whether South Africa has adopted role-playing in its interactions with UN 
peace missions or has internalised the norms and appropriate behaviour defined by the UN is 
whether it agrees with this behaviour as being appropriate and the right thing to do. Norms 
surrounding the appropriate behaviour towards women and the prohibition of sexual violence 
are relatively recent as stand-alone norms. The Rome Statute, to which South Africa is a 
party, only came into force in 2002 and the UN’s zero-tolerance policy began to take shape in 
2003. However, as early as 1996, the South African Government’s Defence White Paper 
already demonstrated a human rights-centred approach to security.352 Although it is not 
mentioned explicitly, SEA arguably constitutes human rights violations.  
As discussed in previous sections of this chapter and in chapter 4, South Africa has taken 
multiple steps to address the SEA committed by its personnel, going beyond what is required. 
This included introducing pre-deployment vetting systems, pre-emptively repatriating at-risk 
units, and amending domestic military disciplinary legislation for better alignment with UN 
policies and values. If this is merely role-play, it certainly demonstrates a commitment to 
looking the part. In fact, at the state-level, South Africa has undertaken actions that are 
complementary to the zero-tolerance normative framework prior to its formal creation, 
suggesting that its behaviour is not solely the product of UN regulations.  Nevertheless, the 
UN’s framework and South Africa’s obligations to train and discipline its personnel in that 
arrangement have certainly influenced interventions that are more recent. It is also entirely 
possible that these interventions are influenced by the prospects of harsher punishments and 
                                                 
 
351 Park, “Socialisation and the liberal order,” 339. 
352 Shelton, 3. 
77 
 
international shame since the passing of UNSC S/RES/2272 in 2016. On the contrary, 
behaviour that is initially motivated by consequences can still evolve into being motivated by 
appropriateness; role-related habits can become internalised and achieve taken-for-granted 
status. That SEA still occurs does not mean that South Africa has not moved away from role-
playing. The fact that the country’s achievements still elicit praise within the international 
system suggests that the UN is attempting to diffuse the norm through institutionalisation and 
enforce compliance while simultaneously expecting member states to behave as if norms 
have already been internalised through socialisation. 
The literature consulted discusses normative suasion as a means to achieve Norm 
Internalisation through persuasion and discussion. The configuration of peace missions, the 
legal complexities, the roles, and the division of responsibilities makes it difficult to reach a 
stage where persuasion can be used as a tool at the stage that a peace mission is already 
occurring. This is partly because the UN requires TCCs to agree legally to behave according 
to a framework. The six resolutions that have been passed in the UNSC and UNGA show the 
role that persuasion can play. Draft resolutions require negotiation and persuasion to secure 
enough support to pass – although this is not always the case as some resolutions are adopted 
without a vote. For example, in September 2018, the UNGA adopted draft resolution 
document A/72/L.69 on UN actions on SEA without a vote.353 
Yet the persuasion processes involved in resolution lobbying do not always result in the 
adoption of the logic of appropriateness. States can vote in favour of, or against, a resolution 
for self-serving purposes or fear of retribution; for instance, in 2018 the United States of 
America (US) threatened to withdraw foreign aid to countries that did not vote with the US 
on key political decisions at the UN.354 Such an example demonstrates the difficulty of 
determining when persuasion results in decisions motivated by normative considerations. 
This is because the adoption of norms and the processes of persuasion that lead to their 
adoption is still driven by interests. There is little public information to determine the extent 
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to which South Africa has been persuaded to behave in a manner resulting in norm 
internalisation in peace missions. 
Socialisation processes of norm internalisation demonstrate the interplay between norms and 
interests. The UN is dependent on TCCs like South Africa’s contributions for its peace 
missions to materialise. Nevertheless, when resources are limited and states have a multitude 
of intertwined and overlapping interests, peace mission participation can hardly be guided by 
purely normative justifications. Additionally, the absence of a methodological consensus on 
how to measure emulation means that it is largely at the discretion of the researcher on a 
case-by-case basis. 
5.4. Conclusion 
While the UN takes a hard-line policy stance against sexual misconduct against women by 
personnel on its missions, in practice, they are unlikely to take any actions that may be 
perceived as too drastic. For instance, while it is undisputable that South African personnel 
have problems when it comes to appropriate conduct and discipline, they will likely continue 
to be a major troop contributor to MONUSCO, especially considering that its mandate was 
extended for another year in March 2018. The UN’s reliance on contributions from member 
states for peace missions and the nature of the legal arrangements leaves the burden of 
compliance on the shoulders of the states involved.   
Nonetheless, an examination of South Africa’s policies and practices demonstrates a 
commitment to combatting SEA. South Africa has made use of courts-martial in the DRC 
and has publicly stated that it has recalled several of its personnel as punishment for 
allegations committed while deployed. South African contingents also already have some of 
the highest rates of female participation, which is regularly proposed as a viable solution. 
Notwithstanding the mixed literature and evidence regarding the role that women can play in 
curbing SEA and encouraging reporting crimes, gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping is 
still a worthy goal and the UN could incentivise TCCs by introducing quotas where a 
minimum percentage of women would prioritise the deployment of TCC contingents.355 
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Despite these actions, it is clear that even with the accountability efforts that South African 
officials have taken, disciplinary action has not served as a sufficient deterrent and more 
attention must be given to preventing incidents from occurring in the first place. 
South Africa subscribes to the relative norms that underpin the zero-tolerance policy as well 
as larger normative frameworks towards the appropriate treatment of women. This has been 
achieved through a combination of coercion, competition, learning and emulation. While not 
all of these mechanisms lead to Norm Internalisation on their own, the socialisation processes 
associated with emulation have been present to various extents.  
Within emulation, the socialisation process of role-playing is the process that is the most 
likely based on the available information, although this does not mean that strategic 
calculations and normative suasion have played no roles. In fact, it is difficult to say with 
confidence where one ends and the other begins. Yet, the combination of the three processes 
presents an understanding that South Africa, in its post-apartheid configuration, always had 
an implicit understanding of the wider normative framework within which sexual 
misconduct-related offences lie. The formalisation and development of the pre-existing 
understanding was facilitated by the UN’s zero-tolerance policy. Some of South Africa’s 
interventions have been acknowledged by the UN as international best practice policies, 
which presents a foundation upon which South Africa can align itself with international 
norms to achieve more robust internalisation. 
The UN’s role as both a site and an agent of socialisation is compromised when it comes to 
peace missions and consequently the internalisation is complicated. The UN lacks the 
requisite capacity to effectively use conditionalities or sanctions against South Africa for 
violating its standards of appropriateness due to its reliance on South Africa’s participation. 
Additionally, the UN’s lack of enforcement power when states do transgress the boundaries 
of appropriate behaviour and the political sensitivities around aggravating resource providers 
further complicates matters. The unequal distribution of capabilities in peace missions further 
exacerbates the situation and normative considerations become crucial for compliance.  
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6. Conclusion: Politics of Norm Internalisation 
Sexual exploitation and abuse of women is recognised within the international community as 
unacceptable both morally and legally. The aim of this study is to explore the main political 
dynamics that occur when dealing with sexual misconduct perpetrated by United Nations 
(UN)-affiliated personnel during UN peace missions. South Africa’s commitment to the 
various instruments that seek to reinforce this norm within UN peace missions is evidence of 
their declared belief in this norm. However, the behaviour of its actors contradicts the 
apparent commitment to this norm. This study presents an analysis of norm internalisation by 
South Africa in UN peace missions. this is the case, by analysing by South Africa’s norm 
internalisation in peace missions. 
UN peace missions are collaborative endeavours, which require the participation of multiple 
stakeholders from the UN through the DPKO and its other relevant stakeholders, NGOs, the 
host country and the TCCs and PCCs that provide the personnel and equipment that operate 
on the ground. A set of legal agreements, which establish the roles and responsibilities of 
each party, frame and govern these relationships. These agreements and frameworks are vital 
to the core functioning of peace missions, and are embedded in the sensitive political 
dynamics that underpin peace missions. These dynamics are clear when we consider the 
relationship between the UN and South Africa as a prominent African TCC when it comes to 
addressing the sexual misconduct of national peace mission personnel. 
Sexual violence against women is not new and has been witnessed in several conflicts across 
the world from Bosnia to the DRC. However, the recognition of sexual violence or 
exploitative practices against women in conflict and post-conflict environments as 
inappropriate is relatively recent. The Rome Statute, which only came into effect in 2002, 
was arguably the first time that norms around the appropriate behaviour of women as women 
and more than just civilians were institutionalised, with explicit provisions on sexual violence 
and rape. It is contrary to expectation that while several members of the international 
community – including South Africa – were affirming their support for norms about the 
treatment of women, reports of widespread sexual misconduct by UN peace mission 
personnel were emerging. 
The events in the DRC, which were the catalyst for the UN’s formal zero-tolerance policy, 
highlighted the void between international sentiments about the treatment of women and the 
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reality of how women were treated in conflict and post-conflict environments. However, the 
division of authority in enforcing the zero-tolerance policy is a product of political 
compromise because the UN cannot afford to isolate its partners, as it is dependent on their 
contributions. This weakens the UN’s ability to hold states accountable for violating its 
guidelines of appropriate treatment of women. In the absence of efficient centralised 
accountability mechanisms, the best way to ensure compliance with the zero-tolerance policy 
is to encourage internalisation of the norms that form the foundation of the policy. 
When considering the zero-tolerance policy and the UN’s practices therein, it becomes clear 
that the focus is on encouraging behavioural changes in line with the norms that dictate what 
is appropriate. The norm, most simply put, is that it is inappropriate to sexually abuse or 
exploit women in conflict and post-conflict environments. The reason why the focus is on 
women is that women are disproportionately affected by conflict and are typically the victims 
of sexual violence. If we assume that the best way to comply with a policy is to internalise its 
underlying norms, we must then consider how norms are internalised. The process and 
methods of norm internalisation – when understood through the framework of Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s Norm Life Cycle – demonstrates that the process is not straight forward, especially 
when it is complicated by the UN-TCC dynamics. These political dynamics influence the 
way norms are internalised; therefore, Norm Internalisation should be understood as a 
political process. 
In Chapter 2, Gilardi and Checkel provide methods to understand the mechanisms through 
which norms can be internalised: coercion, competition, learning and emulation. While all 
four mechanisms can occur simultaneously, Norm Internalisation is reached primarily 
through emulation, as emulation shifts the motivation for actions from being driven by 
consequences to being driven by what is considered appropriate. The UN determines what is 
considered appropriate behaviour in peace missions, but participating states must engage with 
the UN to internalise and reproduce that appropriate behaviour. Emulation therefore results in 
more than a declaration of support for the norm, but also behaviour that is consistent with the 
underlying norms.  
Chapter 3 discussed the evolution of the zero-tolerance policy against the backdrop of the 
first reports of widespread abuses in the DRC. The first formal element of the zero-tolerance 
policy was introduced in 2003 with Bulletin ST/SGB/2003/13. This policy evolved with the 
recommendations of the Zeid Report in 2005, the amendment of the Model MOU in 2007 and 
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the six SEA-focussed UNGA and UNSC resolutions that were passed between 2003 and 
2018. Mission specific interventions were also introduced in MONUC and MONUSCO. It is 
these documents that collectively form the zero-tolerance policy in which the UN sets out the 
standards of behaviour that it deems appropriate for all peace mission personnel. What is 
important with this policy is that all countries that contribute personnel are legally bound to 
uphold them. The individuals deployed as part of these contingents also commit to abide by 
the appropriate behaviour and receive SEA-focussed pre-deployment training.  
Even with the comprehensive framework within which South Africa as a TCC has committed 
to operate, its personnel have on numerous occasions been accused of SEA. The allegations 
against South African personnel and the concomitant government policies to address this 
issue are discussed in Chapter 4. It is a great concern that there is currently no domestic 
framework with explicit SEA provisions, although that is under development with the 
Military Disciplinary Bill. Although the Military Disciplinary Bill has not yet been passed, it 
presents opportunities for future research to evaluate the impact of more comprehensive 
domestic disciplinary policies with explicit SEA provisions. Despite South Africa’s 
reputation of having poorly disciplined personnel, it continues to declare its support for the 
norms that guide the zero-tolerance policy and there is evidence to suggest that it has 
supported these norms – at least on paper – even before the zero-tolerance policy was 
formalised. This is where the primary focus of this research lies: exploring the main political 
dynamics that occur when dealing with sexual misconduct perpetrated by UN peace mission 
personnel through an examination of the underlying norms. 
Chapter 5 provides the key normative analysis of the practices undertaken by South Africa in 
addressing the sexual misconduct of its personnel. This analysis tracks South Africa’s 
practices against the four methods of norm internalisation, while considering the role that the 
UN-South Africa relationship plays in each step.  
If one considers the extent of the practices that have been implemented by South Africa, it 
would be difficult to argue that it has not adopted the norms regarding the appropriate 
treatment of women in conflict and post-conflict environments. This is despite its 
acknowledged domestic challenges with high levels of gender-based violence against women. 
While this goes beyond the scope of this research, it presents opportunities for further 
research on the relationship between domestic attitudes towards sexual violence against 
women and South African peacekeeper sexual misconduct. The reasons for adopting these 
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norms need not be altruistic, nor are they. South Africa’s adoption of international norms that 
have a human rights component cannot be divorced from its pursuit of international 
legitimacy and international identity-construction in the mid-1990s after the end of apartheid. 
However, subscribing to the norm and behaving in accordance with it do not necessarily need 
to have the same motivations. 
Coercive measures, while used in a limited fashion by the UN, have not proved an effective 
way to enforce compliance or accelerate Norm Internalisation. This is due to the UN’s 
dependence on troop and equipment contributions. The literature is clear that South Africa’s 
personnel have been accused of sexual misconduct on numerous occasions despite efforts by 
the country to minimise their occurrence and seek rapid accountability where possible 
through courts-martial. Yet, South Africa is likely to remain a major TCC for MONUSCO 
due to its general troop and FIB contributions as well as its political history in the DRC. The 
scope for competition and learning concerning appropriate behaviour in peace missions is 
also limited, especially as these processes are primarily driven by interstate interactions and 
relationships.  
Norm Internalisation is characterised by ‘taken-for-granted’ status and an understanding that 
something is the right thing to do. The focus on accountability after-the-fact therefore does 
little to change the behaviour of deployed personnel in order to prevent such incidents from 
occurring in the first place.  
However, the continued existence of SEA allegations against South African personnel does 
not negate interventions made by the state to address SEA, especially when there are attempts 
to hold perpetrators accountable. To simplify, a person who steals does not contradict the 
normative (and legal) provisions that stealing is wrong. If this person is prosecuted and 
incarcerated accordingly, the punishment reinforces the state’s conviction that stealing is 
wrong and those who steal should be punished. The challenge is to get people to a point 
where they understand and accept – or internalise – that theft is wrong. Although this 
illustration is oversimplified, it represents the same conundrum faced by South Africa on its 
journey towards Norm Internalisation. Socialisation through strategic calculations, role-
playing or normative suasion provide the best available answers on how to achieve 
internalisation that results in sustained behavioural change. It is, however, difficult to 
pinpoint exactly when states have been socialised into adopting the logic of appropriateness 
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and behaving in a manner motivated by what is appropriate as opposed to what is not with 
concomitant consequences. 
South Africa’s policies and practices regarding SEA by its personnel deployed in the UN’s 
DRC mission, it can best be understood as role-playing. The UN as both the site and agent of 
socialisation prescribes what is considers appropriate and plays a role in state identity-
formation by giving states a platform from which they can mould their international identities 
in their multilateral interactions. South Africa’s identity, although not always clear, is largely 
informed by distancing the country from its apartheid history and international pariah status. 
By demonstrating a commitment in both policy and practice to addressing SEA, South Africa 
behaves in a manner that is consistent with the role it is required to play as a TCC in a UN 
peace mission. This behaviour includes investigating and court-martialling those accused of 
SEA as well as engaging in best-practice activities like pre-deployment vetting and proactive 
repatriation. Even though the UN has limited enforcement authority, the incentive for South 
Africa to comply with UN recommendations on SEA are informed by its role as a major TCC 
and its commitment to international best practice in its international peace mission 
participation. 
There is enough evidence to support the perception that South Africa is on a socialisation 
journey that may turn its current role-playing activities into unquestioned habits, for example, 
by amending its domestic legislation on military discipline to promote greater alignment with 
UN conduct provisions. South Africa’s attempts demonstrate that the political dynamics 
between the UN and TCCs in peace missions requires both actors to participate in the 
process, as neither actor can control the other. Limited resources and restrictive legal 
obligations mean that South Africa must subscribe to the norms around protecting women, 
internalise them, and behave accordingly, for the dynamic with the UN to be fruitful.  
However, the lack of definitive or objective criteria with which to determine when taken-for-
granted status has implications for future research on Norm Internalisation. Additionally, this 
study demonstrates that there are several opportunities for continued research on the topic of 
Norm Internalisation and peacekeeper sexual misconduct. More data on the prevalence on 
SEA, combined with a normative analytical approach, can be used to evaluate current 
interventions and redesign pre-deployment training, or amend the zero-tolerance policy if 
necessary. By placing the norms around the appropriate treatment of women at the centre of 
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academic study and policy, interventions that focus on the dignity of the victims as well as 
accountability for perpetrators can be developed.  
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